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FOREWORD: WHY THIS REPORT MATTERS
Virtually every major trade or industry – from plumbing to policing, from banking to broadcasting – is subject to some form of regulatory framework. Effective regulation stands alongside the law as an essential means of upholding 
professional standards, promoting confidence in practitioners, and holding individuals 
and powerful corporations to account for negligence or wrongdoing. 
This study examines the background, structure and performance of the Independent Press 
Standards Organisation (IPSO), which since 2014 has been presented by large parts of 
the press industry as the principal regulator of print and online journalism in the UK. It 
concludes that IPSO is deliberately constrained by the newspaper industry from acting as 
an effective, independent regulator that can uphold professional standards and command 
public respect. 
In fact, this report shows, for the first time, how the IPSO structure was essentially created 
by the industry in advance of – and not in response to – the Leveson Report. It was 
designed to perform the function of a complaints handler rather than a genuine industry 
regulator, much like its discredited predecessor the Press Complaints Commission (PCC). 
It was therefore never intended, nor is it able, to operate according to the clear principles 
for effective and independent self-regulation laid down by Lord Justice Leveson.
For journalism, the consequences of absent or ineffectual regulation can be profound. It is 
unfair to the public who see injustices go unchallenged. It is unfair to the vast majority of 
working journalists who care about standards and follow agreed professional codes, but see 
poor practices ignored and misconduct go unpunished. And crucially, it undermines trust 
in a vital democratic institution at a time that professional newsgathering and accurate 
reporting is under huge pressure from social media platforms.
There are further consequences of this deficient regulation for imminent legislative 
initiatives around online harm and digital markets. In attempting to differentiate between 
social media platforms and news publishers, these initiatives will seek to protect certain 
journalistic privileges by reference to regulatory bodies that purport to implement 
codes of practice. Those bodies will effectively be interpreted as guarantors of 
professional journalistic standards. It is clear from this study that IPSO is not in a 
position to fulfil this regulatory responsibility. 
Parliament has legislated for an independent process of press self-regulation, as 
recommended by Lord Justice Leveson in his landmark report. The Press Recognition 
Panel was established precisely to act as a guarantor of regulatory standards in which the 
public and journalists can have faith, and has since recognised IMPRESS as a self-regulator 
that meets those standards. As long as IPSO chooses to remain outside the framework of 
independent scrutiny, there can be no assurance that it acts as a genuinely independent 
arbiter of professional standards.
Both the British public and working journalists deserve regulation that is effective 
without inhibiting a free press, is genuinely independent, and commands public 
respect; future public policy interventions must take account of the continuing 
determination of the industry to avoid proper scrutiny and accountability.
Gordon Ramsay & Steven Barnett
21 May 2021
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KEY POINTS
Part 1 – Independence and Effectiveness: The Creation of IPSO
¡ IPSO was largely created from draft proposals submitted by the newspaper industry to the 
Leveson Inquiry in July 2012. It was rejected as an effective plan by Sir Brian Leveson.
¡ Of 84 components of the draft industry proposal, three-quarters were incorporated into the 
governance documents of IPSO, despite Leveson’s explicit rejection. 
¡ In some areas, the industry actually weakened its own Leveson proposals when transferring 
them to IPSO. These dilutions included the definition of a ‘systemic failure’ necessary for 
IPSO to launch a standards investigation and levy fines on members.
¡ IPSO bypassed the vast majority of Leveson’s recommendations, but its creation was 
accompanied by a comprehensive lobbying operation from news publishers designed to 
create the opposite impression.
Part 2 – Enforcement: Standards Investigations and Sanctions
¡ A last-minute wording change inserted by the newspaper industry ensures that IPSO has 
almost no ability to launch a standards investigation or impose financial sanctions.
¡ IPSO’s inability to deploy a credible enforcement function essentially reduces its regulatory 
powers to that of a complaints-handling body. It does not satisfy the definition of a regulator.
¡ A series of case studies – on IPSO’s response to clear examples of discrimination, inaccuracy 
and journalistic subterfuge – illustrate its lack of power in enforcing journalistic standards.   
Part 3 – Monitoring, Complaints-Handling and Transparency
¡ IPSO does not record code breaches in members’ internal complaints processes; it therefore 
cannot effectively monitor compliance with the Editors’ Code.
¡ There are significant problems in how IPSO’s complaints-handling balances interests of 
members against those of complainants.
¡ IPSO’s annual reports do not fully satisfy their own regulations: they fail to include 
information on the adequacy and effectiveness of members’ compliance processes.
¡ Several IPSO members – including one of the largest local publishers – do not supply sufficient 
information on their websites for members of the public to make an informed complaint.
¡ Published annual statements by IPSO members fail to satisfy regulatory obligations, despite 
IPSO acknowledging that reform in this area was needed. 
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SUMMARY
REPEATING THE CYCLE BY EVADING REFORM
The newspaper industry’s response to the Leveson Inquiry was not – as with previous 
public inquiries into systemic failures of press regulation – an exercise in cherry-
picking and selective reform. Instead, the industry itself produced a new system in 
July 2012, months before any public recommendations. It then effectively ignored the 
recommendations of a judicial inquiry in favour of its own system.
IPSO and the industry’s July 2012 draft plan are not exact matches, but the adoption of 
three-quarters of its proposals into the IPSO documentation demonstrates a clear lineage 
between the two, as does replication of some passages word for word. Furthermore, some 
elements of the industry plan were accepted by Leveson, only then to be weakened or 
effectively removed when IPSO’s documents were finalised.  
This refusal to take notice of a year-long judicial inquiry in response to a collapse in 
professional standards is compounded by the industry’s behaviour in acting as lobbyist 
and propagandist to further its own self-interest through the columns of its newspapers. 
In the event of further public interventions in this area – which history suggests are 
almost inevitable – any subsequent inquiry should consider this analysis when engaging 
with the industry. 
It is perfectly possible that IPSO will perform all of its duties and functions impeccably 
(though Parts 2 and 3 of this report demonstrate clear deficiencies), and that its staff are 
diligent in fulfilling their responsibilities. But IPSO’s regulatory powers are determined 
by the governance documents that set out its articles, its rules and regulations, and its 
contractual agreement with its members. As this report shows, the key components of 
this framework were produced by the industry in advance of Leveson’s report and retain 
industry influence over its own regulation. 
Without major structural reform – as advocated by Leveson in his comprehensive 
rejection of the industry’s proposed plan – IPSO cannot be anything other than a 
body that is, as the second Calcutt Report eloquently described the Press Complaints 
Commission in 1993, ‘set up by the industry, financed by the industry, dominated by 
the industry, and operating a code of practice devised by the industry and which is over-
favourable to the industry.’1
1 Department of National Heritage (1993), Review of Press Self-Regulation, London: HMSO, Para 5.26, p. 41.
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COSMETIC CHANGE WITH SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS
Vital components of Leveson’s framework were the new regulator’s powers of investigation 
and the ability to impose meaningful sanctions on miscreant publishers. These would 
ensure that the public had recourse to a genuine regulator rather than simply a complaints-
handling regime of the kind operated by the old PCC. 
Ostensibly, the IPSO framework provides for such powers. However, on proper 
examination, it is clear that the Regulatory Articles are drafted in such a way as to render 
those powers virtually worthless. Crucially, the ‘serious and systemic failure’ formulation 
– inserted at the last minute into IPSO’s regulations by industry representatives – 
significantly raises the bar by which an investigation may be proactively launched, and 
thus weakens a core regulatory function. It remains unclear why representatives of IPSO, 
in public statements that in many ways echo those of the PCC, defend those parts of its 
constitutional documents that significantly limit its own powers.2 
It is still possible for the ‘serious and systemic’ definition to be tested but – as the case 
studies outlined here demonstrate – even in very high-profile cases IPSO either lacks 
the ability to intervene (as with discrimination) or has elected not to do so, even when 
presented with significant evidence of potential wrongdoing. Whether such inaction 
is due to an intentionally high bar imposed by the industry when drafting IPSO’s 
regulations, or to institutional resistance by IPSO itself, a power that remains unused 
whatever the circumstances is as redundant as a power that cannot be invoked. Both 
outcomes suggest that IPSO in its current form cannot call itself ‘a regulator as that 
term is commonly understood.’3 It is in that respect virtually no different from the 
discredited PCC.
BLIND SPOTS IN MONITORING AND OPACITY IN 
TRANSPARENCY
Documentary and empirical evidence demonstrates that IPSO is structurally unable to 
fulfil a comprehensive monitoring role via its recording and handling of complaints, and 
fails to satisfy the transparency commitments laid down in its own governance documents. 
2. IPSO (2019) ‘Response to the Media Standards Trust report’, ipso.co.uk: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf
3 Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf  (p. 1541).
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Shortcomings in IPSO’s complaints-handling functions demonstrate the system’s inability 
to monitor effectively the industry it is supposed to hold to account. Moreover, its 
failure to obtain or publish any information about the extent of code breaches handled 
in members’ own internal complaints processes – a problem noted and criticised by its 
own internal review in 2016 – further diminishes IPSO’s ability to assess compliance of 
its members with the standards it purports to be policing. It is also hampered by its own 
regulations which specify various circumstances where code breaches cannot be recorded.
In terms of IPSO’s own transparency – publication of annual reports summarising its own 
activities and those of its members – IPSO does not provide all the information called 
for in its own regulations. In particular, the absence of information on the ‘adequacy and 
effectiveness of the compliance processes and procedures’ of publishers, as required by 
IPSO’s governing documents, severely limits a proper assessment of whether the regulatory 
regime is working even within its own narrow terms.  
Just as IPSO itself fails to fulfil its transparency commitments, so do its members. 
While the websites of most national newspapers contain relevant information and links 
for potential complainants, this material is less readily available across the hundreds of 
local newspapers published by the UK’s largest regional publishers. A lack of relevant 
information on some members’ mobile apps is an additional oversight. IPSO members 
are also inconsistent in the extent to which their annual statements fulfil information 
obligations. 
Leveson specified that enforcement of standards was integral to effective regulation and 
that ‘compliance … should be transparent and demonstrable to the public.’ The analysis in 
Part 3 suggests that the IPSO system is not equipped to monitor industry compliance with 
the Editors’ Code, and does not fully satisfy its own commitments to transparency. Perhaps 
more importantly, the absence of adequate monitoring powers demonstrates that IPSO, 
like the PCC before it, cannot satisfy the definition of a regulator. 
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INTRODUCTION
In July this year it will be ten years since the Leveson Inquiry was launched. Set up by David Cameron’s coalition 
government in response to Guardian revelations about phone hacking at the News of the World, the 14-month 
judicial investigation exposed a raft of legal and ethical wrongdoing across large areas of the UK’s national press. 
It culminated in a number of recommendations to replace the discredited Press Complaints Commission – the 
industry self-regulator first established in 1991 – with a reformed framework for independent and effective self-
regulation. The new system was carefully designed to reassure both the public and journalists that there would be 
genuine accountability for industry misconduct while preserving freedom of the press. 
Most of the industry, however, rejected key elements of the Leveson framework, and in September 2014 
created the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), covering 90% of national newspapers by 
circulation and the majority of the UK’s regional newspapers and magazines.4 Though launched in defiance 
of the main Leveson recommendations, IPSO was hailed by the industry as ‘the toughest regulator … in the 
developed world’5 and proclaimed itself to be ‘based upon the Leveson recommendations.’6
In nearly seven years of operation, IPSO has faced criticism from a variety of sources, including 
Parliamentary committees,7 think tanks,8 pressure groups and rival regulatory bodies.9 Perhaps the 
most damning verdict came from the 2021 annual report of the Press Recognition Panel (PRP), the 
body established by Royal Charter in 2013 – as agreed by Parliament – to determine whether press self-
regulators met Leveson criteria. The PRP was unequivocal about IPSO’s failings:
IPSO is not a regulator and it manifestly does not meet the Royal Charter criteria. It does not 
provide the public with the necessary levels of protection intended following the Leveson Inquiry 
even for those publishers signed up to it. IPSO is not independent of the industry, and it is not 
possible to discern a full and clear picture of the complaints it receives.10
4. IPSO’s governing documents were first published in full in October 2013; the regulator began operating 11 months later.
5. Burrell, Ian (2013) ‘Press announces timetable for “toughest regulator in the world”,’ independent.co.uk, 24 October 2013: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/press-announces-timetable-toughest-regulator-world-8902402.html 
6. IPSO (n.d.) ‘IPSO response to the DCMS and Home Office Consultation on the Leveson Inquiry and its implementation,’ 
ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1295/ipso-response-to-the-dcms-and-home-office-consultation-on-the-
leveson-inquiry-and-its-implementation.pdf
7. House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee (n.d.) ‘Press regulation inquiry,’ old.parliament.uk: https://
old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/communications-committee/inquiries/
parliament-2010/press-regulation---where-are-we-now/; House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee (n.d.) ‘Dealing with complaints against the press inquiry,’ old.parliament.uk: https://old.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/culture-media-and-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/
complaints-against-the-press-16–17/; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (n.d.) ‘Hate crime and its violent 
consequences inquiry,’ old.parliament.uk: https://old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/home-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry3/
8. Media Standards Trust (2019) The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) – Five Years On, London: Media 
Standards Trust: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MST-IPSO-2019-Final-Version.pdf
9. Heawood, Jonathan (2013) ‘Why the Impress Project wants to talk about press regulation,’ theguardian.com, 9 December 
2013: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/08/impress-project-press-regulation-ipso
10 Press Recognition Panel (2021) Annual report on the recognition system, February 2021, https://pressrecognitionpanel.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PRP-Annual-Recognition-Report-Feb-2021-FINAL.pdf, London: Press Recognition Panel, p. 8.
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This report focuses on three important areas where IPSO has been deficient in both its creation and its 
performance. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for this critique.
In practice, history has shown that selective industry-led reforms have followed all seven public 
interventions in press self-regulation since 1947 (including Leveson), in every case to the industry’s benefit 
and the public’s detriment – thus sowing the seeds for each subsequent collapse in industry standards. 
The sheer predictability of this cycle obliges us to monitor the latest incarnation of industry-led reform to 
determine whether the same structural weaknesses are present again.
Theoretically, the interventions of IPSO-affiliated newspapers during and after Leveson – exploiting their 
journalism platforms to act as both lobbyists and propagandists for their own interests while frequently 
distorting the facts – raise profound questions about the interplay of journalism and democratic policy-
making, and the potentially corrosive role of the industry in media policy debates. 
This report therefore explores three key areas of IPSO’s operation which are highly relevant to those 
considerations: to what extent was IPSO ever designed to be ‘based upon the Leveson recommendations?’ 
How did a small but highly significant wording change compromise IPSO’s ability to act as a regulator? 
And to what extent is it genuinely able to hold the industry to account? Our conclusion in all three cases 
is that IPSO’s hands have been tied by the industry, and that it simply does not have the tools to fulfil the 
task of genuinely independent and effective self-regulation. 
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
PART 1 traces the origins of the IPSO system. It is the first systematic analysis of how the newspaper 
industry bypassed, rather than adapted, the Leveson recommendations in order to implement its own 
premeditated regulatory system. It shows how IPSO incorporates almost three-quarters of the structural 
components of a system submitted by the newspaper industry to the Leveson Inquiry – a system that was 
comprehensively rejected by Leveson because of the constraints it placed on the regulator’s independence 
and effectiveness.
PART 2 investigates a crucial last-minute change to IPSO’s regulations that effectively nullifies its ability 
to launch investigations into breaches of the standards code – precisely the regulatory lever that was 
supposed to differentiate IPSO from the discredited PCC. The industry’s simple substitution between July 
and October 2013 of ‘serious and systemic’ for ‘serious or systemic’ in defining the context for launching 
a standards investigation was a sleight of hand that renders IPSO’s regulatory powers virtually worthless. 
This part uses case studies to demonstrate the real-world impact of this subtle change on IPSO’s responses 
to demonstrable code breaches. 
PART 3 assesses IPSO’s ability to monitor its members’ compliance with its own standards code, and to 
what extent it fulfils its own commitment to transparency. It reveals significant gaps in IPSO’s ability to 
measure code breaches and therefore to conduct the core regulatory function of enforcing standards. After 
analysing annual statements from IPSO and its member publishers, and auditing available information for 
potential complainants, it concludes that IPSO is unable to provide key information called for in its own 
regulations, including levels of compliance from member publications. It also shows how information on 
how to use the regulatory system can be difficult to find for potential complainants. 
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PART 1: INDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
– THE CREATION OF IPSO
KEY POINTS
¡ IPSO was largely created from draft proposals submitted by the newspaper industry to the 
Leveson Inquiry in July 2012. It was rejected as an effective plan by Sir Brian Leveson. 
¡ Of 84 components of the draft industry proposal, three-quarters were incorporated into the 
governance documents of IPSO, despite Leveson’s explicit rejection. 
¡ In some areas, the industry actually weakened its own Leveson proposals when transferring 
them to IPSO. These dilutions included the definition of a ‘systemic failure’ necessary for IPSO 
to launch a standards investigation and levy fines on members.
¡ IPSO bypassed the vast majority of Leveson’s recommendations, but its creation was 
accompanied by a comprehensive lobbying operation from news publishers designed to create 
the opposite impression.
CYCLICAL FAILURES OF PRESS SELF-REGULATION: THE 
ROAD TO THE LEVESON INQUIRY 
While revelations of illegal phone hacking at the UK’s highest circulation newspaper, the News of the World, 
were the immediate trigger for creation of the Leveson Inquiry in 2011, the inquiry itself heard evidence of 
wide-ranging misconduct and ethical lapses in the press. This ranged from breaches of data law by private 
investigators linked to major newspapers to gross invasions of privacy and other abuses of professional 
practice which, in the words of Leveson himself, ‘wreaked havoc in the lives of ordinary people.’
Underlying all of this evidence was a fundamental systemic problem: the comprehensive failure of the 
newspaper industry’s self-regulatory body, the Press Complaints Commission, to hold the industry to account. 
This collapse in effective regulatory oversight was not an unusual event in British press history: the Leveson 
Inquiry marked the seventh major public intervention into press regulation since the Second World War.11 
Royal Commissions reporting in 1949 and 1962, the Younger Committee on Privacy (1972), a third Royal 
Commission in 1977, the Calcutt Committee of 1990 and its follow-up report in 1993 were all convened 
in order to deal with ethical lapses by the press and the shortcomings of existing regulatory regimes. 
Following each investigation and report, an almost identical sequence of events played out: ‘after each public 
intervention the industry procrastinated before instituting reforms, often delaying until legislation was 
threatened, and then only introducing reforms selectively.’12
11. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume I, London: The 
Stationery Office: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/270939/0780_i.pdf (Volume I, Part D, Chapter 1, pp. 195–218)
12. Ramsay, Gordon and Martin Moore (2019) ‘Press Repeat: Media self-regulation in the United Kingdom after Leveson,’ in 
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In every instance, that selectivity involved unilateral rejection of recommendations deemed by the 
industry to be especially inconvenient or detrimental to its own interests. In each case, the root causes 
of the problem were left unresolved.13
Thus, when the industry set up the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) in the wake of the 1990 Calcutt 
Report, it simply ignored those recommendations it disliked. In his own review of the PCC after two years 
of its operation, Sir David Calcutt himself was scathing:
The Press Complaints Commission is not, in my view, an effective regulator of the press. It has not 
been set up in a way, and is not operating a code of practice, which enables it to command not only 
press but also public confidence. It does not, in my view, hold the balance fairly between the press 
and the individual. It is not the truly independent body which it should be. As constituted it is, in 
essence, a body set up by the industry, financed by the industry, dominated by the industry, and 
operating a code of practice devised by the industry and which is over-favourable to the industry.14
Between Calcutt and Leveson, therefore, the newspaper industry had avoided recommended reforms 
and created a system independently judged to further its own interests rather than act as a regulator 
for the public. It faced down a Conservative government which ultimately decided not to enforce the 
recommendations of the Inquiry.15
Leveson’s critique of the PCC was couched in similar terms to Calcutt’s, this time informed by nearly two 
decades of evidence. He concluded that the PCC was ‘constrained by serious structural deficiencies which 
limit what it can do,’ including a lack of independence from the industry via an over-powerful funding 
body; insufficient powers to launch investigations or even to investigate breaches of the standards code; 
and a willingness to act only ‘to head off criticism of the press or self-regulation.’16 Leveson’s final summary 
of the PCC system echoed those of Calcutt:
The failings which have fatally undermined the PCC and caused policy makers and the public 
to lose trust in the self-regulatory system are not new. They have been consistently identified by 
external scrutiny for at least a decade. The twin failure of both the self-regulatory system and 
the industry to address these problems is itself evidence that there has been no real appetite for 
an effective and adequate system of regulation from within the industry, in spite of a professed 
openness to reform and self-criticism. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the self-regulatory 
system was run for the benefit of the press not of the public.17
Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler and Matthias Karmasin (eds.) Media Accountability in the Era of Post-Truth Politics: 
European Challenges and Perspectives, London: Routledge (pp. 85–86)
13. Media Standards Trust (2012) A Free and Accountable Media – Reform of press self-regulation: report and 
recommendations, London: Media Standards Trust: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/
downloads/2012/06/MST-A-Free-and-Accountable-Media-21–06-12.pdf (p. 10)
14. Department of National Heritage (1993) Review of Press Self-Regulation, London: HMSO (p. 41)
15. Ramsay, Gordon and Martin Moore (2019) ‘Press Repeat: Media self-regulation in the United Kingdom after Leveson,’ in 
Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler and Matthias Karmasin (eds.) Media Accountability in the Era of Post-Truth Politics: 
European Challenges and Perspectives, London: Routledge (p. 87)
16. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part J, 
Chapter 8, pp. 1576–1579
17. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (p. 1579)
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The PCC was therefore both a repetition of the cycle of selective and cosmetic reform by the newspaper 
industry seen in the previous six attempts to improve UK press regulation, and a primary factor in the 
regulatory collapse that led to the seventh attempt – the Leveson Inquiry. In fact, as Leveson concluded, 
the way in which the industry had set up its own self-regulatory body in 1991 meant that the PCC was 
not a regulator ‘as that term is commonly understood’ and ‘little more than a complaints-handling body.’18
LEVESON’S RESPONSE
In order to prevent a repetition of this cycle, Leveson set out the criteria for a regulatory solution: 
1. Effectiveness
2. Fairness and objectivity of standards
3. Independence and transparency of enforcement and compliance
4. Powers and remedies
5. Funding – to ensure sufficient finance for operational independence and scope.19
His final report contained 47 recommendations for a new regulatory system, of which 38 applied to 
the regulator itself.20 It accepted the principle of non-compulsory self-regulation, but underpinned by 
legislation to ensure that self-regulators remained genuinely independent and effective, and to incentivise 
membership. Leveson argued that the industry should be given 12 months to adopt this system, with 
statutory regulation implemented if it failed to do so.
The system can be summarised as follows: 
¡ A regulator (or regulators) set up by or on behalf of publishers, in accordance with the Leveson criteria 
for a regulatory system, backed up by:
¡ A mechanism of independent verification to ensure that the regulator(s) met, and continued to meet, 
those criteria;
¡ An arbitration service providing low-cost resolution of civil claims between members of the public 
and publishers;
¡ Changes to existing law or guidelines to give force to incentives for members of a recognised 
regulator (and by definition denied to non-members).21
18. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (p. 1541)
19. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (Chapter 1, 
pp. 1583–1584)
20. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (Part L, 
pp. 1803–1809)
21. These changes would cover i. Awards of legal costs in cases where a claimant or publisher chooses to bypass the low-
cost arbitration system; and ii. An extension of exemplary damages in media cases where a publisher has shown wilful 
disregard of standards, but removal of such damages for members of a recognised regulator: Ramsay, Gordon and Martin 
Moore (2019) ‘Press Repeat: Media self-regulation in the United Kingdom after Leveson,’ in Tobias Eberwein, Susanne 
Fengler and Matthias Karmasin (eds.) Media Accountability in the Era of Post-Truth Politics: European Challenges and 
Perspectives, London: Routledge (p. 89)
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This system was designed both to prevent another collapse in professional standards, and to avoid the 
structural deficiencies of a self-regulatory system in which the interests of the regulator, the industry 
funding body, and the Editors’ Code of Practice Committee were so closely aligned. Those inherent 
structural problems included: constraints on the regulator’s independence posed by the wide-ranging 
powers of industry funding body PressBoF;22 insufficient powers for the regulator to investigate alleged 
breaches of its own code;23 and inadequate sanctions to dissuade members from repeating transgressions 
or to satisfy complainants that wrongs had been redressed.24
His report drew attention to industry intransigence in responding to previous calls for reform, and 
anticipated the likely nature of industry opposition:
Despite what will be said about these recommendations by those who oppose them, this is not, and 
cannot be characterised as, statutory regulation of the press. What is proposed here is independent 
regulation of the press organised by the press, with a statutory verification process to ensure that the 
required levels of independence and effectiveness are met by the system in order for publishers to 
take advantage of the benefits arising as a result of membership.25
THE PRESS RESPONSE TO LEVESON: PREPARING THE 
GROUND FOR IPSO
Most press coverage was as ferociously critical as Leveson had predicted. An analysis of newspaper coverage 
during the Inquiry conducted by the Media Standards Trust found that 76% of all articles expressing an 
opinion were negative, with hostility increasing dramatically in the 100 days prior to publication. The 
Inquiry itself was portrayed as a potential threat to press freedom or as fundamentally flawed in its terms 
of reference and execution. While the press actively promoted the industry’s own proposals for a new 
regulatory model, alternative draft models went almost entirely unreported.26
While using their newspaper columns to attack the Inquiry, an influential group of publishers launched an 
intense lobbying campaign, including the creation of an industry lobby group, the ‘Free Speech Network.’ 
Its activities included running an advertising campaign with full page ads in multiple titles which 
portrayed the forthcoming (and to date unspecified) Leveson recommendations as ‘state control of the 
press’ alongside photographs of dictators such as Kim Jong-Un and Robert Mugabe.27
22. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part J, 
Chapter 4, Part 8, Paragraph 8.1 (p. 1576)
23. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part J, 
Chapter 4, Part 8, Paragraphs 8.4 and 8.7 (p. 1577–1578)
24. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part J, 
Chapter 4, Part 8, Paragraph 8.9 (p. 1578)
25. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Executive Summary, London: The 
Stationery Office: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/229039/0779.pdf, Paragraph 73, p17
26. Ramsay, Gordon (2013) Analysis: Press Coverage of Leveson, Part I: The Inquiry, London: Media Standards Trust: http://
mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/05/MST-Leveson-Analysis-090513-v2.pdf
27. Greenslade, Roy (2012) ‘Newspapers urge Cameron to put press back in the Last Chance Saloon,’ theguardian.com, 26 
November 2012: https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2012/nov/26/national-newspapers-leveson-inquiry
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In the year following publication of the Leveson Report on 29 November there were a number of key 
events, including the creation of IPSO: 28
¡ 29 November 2012: immediately after publication, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected any use of 
statute to underpin the proposed framework;
¡ 12 February 2013: after one of Cameron’s colleagues proposed using a Royal Charter in place of 
legislation, this was negotiated in secret with the newspaper industry before finally being made public. 
It contained multiple concessions to the press;29
¡ 14 March 2013: cross-party talks between the three main political parties to finalise the Charter 
broke down, while three national newspaper publishers – covering the Financial Times, the Guardian/
Observer and the Independent – detached themselves from the rest of the industry that had been leading 
negotiations;
¡ 15 March 2013: the Conservative Party put forward its own Charter retaining many of the concessions 
to the newspaper industry. With opposition from both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, however, it 
was clear that this would be defeated in the House of Commons;
¡ 17 March 2013: the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, and Ed Miliband, leader of the Labour Party, agreed a final version of the Charter that was 
considerably closer to Leveson’s original recommendations. The House of Commons overwhelmingly 
approved this version and the legal incentives that gave it force;
¡ 25 April 2013: publishers engaged in devising IPSO proposed a rival draft Charter designed to 
delay ratification of the Charter agreed in Parliament. Their version was further from Leveson’s 
recommendations than anything previously published and placed significant and permanent powers 
in the hands of the industry;
¡ 24 October 2013: a number of newspaper publishers announce a final version of their plans for IPSO;30 
¡ 30 October 2013: a slightly amended version of the Charter agreed in Parliament was published, agreed 
and sealed at a meeting of the Privy Council. 
There was no pretence at fair or balanced reporting of these events in newspapers published by the 
creators of IPSO: their coverage of the Leveson Report and Cross-Party Charter was extensive and 
overwhelmingly hostile. 
Over 2,000 articles were published in the year following publication of Leveson, and a comprehensive 
analysis demonstrated that in the pro-IPSO titles there were over eight ‘negative’ articles about the report 
and Charter for every ‘positive’ article compared to a ratio in non-IPSO titles of approximately 1:1.31 These 
28. Ramsay and Moore (2019) Op. Cit. (pp. 90–93); Media Standards Trust (2013) ‘The Story of Eight Charters,’ 
mediastandardstrust.org, 20 June 2013: http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/the-story-of-eight-charters/
29. This was laid out in a 4 January letter from Peter Wright, a representative of Associated Newspapers (publishers of 
the Daily Mail). Wright was subsequently appointed a member of IPSO’s Complaints Committee when it was created in 
September 2014.
30. These publishers were DMG Media (Mail newspapers); Northern & Shell (Express newspapers); Trinity Mirror (Mirror 
newspapers); Telegraph Media Group (Telegraph newspapers) and News UK (Sun and Times newspapers).
31. Nearly three-quarters of all articles (73%) in IPSO titles depicted Leveson and the Charter as a threat to press freedom, compared 
with 34% in non-IPSO titles. Ramsay, Gordon (2014) How Newspapers Covered Press Regulation after Leveson, London: Media 
Standards Trust, http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Final-Draft-v1-040914.pdf (pp. 27–46)
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titles’ editorial line was equally partisan: of 159 leader articles about Leveson or the Charter, 145 (91%) 
were wholly negative compared to a single positive article. By contrast, their coverage of the industry’s own 
Royal Charter and regulatory system that would become IPSO was highly positive.32
Any suggestion that these publishers were simply reflecting a widespread antagonism to the proposed 
regulatory system amongst their readers was undermined by public opinion surveys. In most polls, there 
were clear majorities for the principle of legal underpinning, for the cross-party Royal Charter agreement, 
and for its specific provisions. These views were found even in the readerships of the publications whose 
reporting on Leveson and the Charter had been almost entirely hostile. When asked specifically if they 
wanted their newspaper to join the Leveson system, readers of IPSO titles were in favour.33
Such deliberately one-sided and frequently misleading coverage by those newspapers involved in 
setting up IPSO raises serious concerns about the role of journalism in media policy-making. Publishers 
deployed powers not available to even the most well-resourced industry lobbyists: the capacity not only 
to lobby privately, but also to shape messaging and influence readers through their newspapers. Their 
excessively negative coverage of Leveson and the Charter, coupled with interventions in the Charter 
process designed to stymie reforms agreed in Parliament and the secretive creation of an entirely separate 
alternative system, reveal an industry determined to evade external reform even after a high-profile collapse 
of standards. They could not even claim public support for their own proposals.
IPSO’S SHORTCOMINGS
Once IPSO had been announced and the governance documents underpinning its structure, articles and 
regulations had been published, a systematic analysis by the Media Standards Trust (MST) assessed to what 
extent its framework met the 38 recommendations for an independent self-regulatory system set out by 
Leveson. It found that IPSO satisfied just 12 out of 38 and failed to satisfy 20, with insufficient evidence 
available for a definitive view on the remaining 6. Of the 20 recommendations that IPSO failed to satisfy, 
the MST concluded that many were key elements of the Leveson system, including independence from the 
industry, access to justice, and complaints-handling. The powers of the Regulatory Funding Company – the 
industry body set up to fund and administer IPSO – were found to be unnecessarily broad and extensive, 
echoing the role of PressBoF in undermining the effectiveness and independence of the PCC.34
A reassessment by the MST in October 2019 painted an even bleaker picture. After five years of 
operation – in which IPSO had secured some amendments to its Articles and Regulations – the MST had 
sufficient evidence to make a definitive assessment on all 38 Leveson recommendations. It found that 
IPSO satisfied just 13 and failed to satisfy 25.35
32. 58% of articles about the newspaper industry’s Charter were positive, as were 65% of articles expressing a view about 
IPSO. Ibid. (pp. 44–50)
33. Ramsay, Gordon (2014) How Newspapers Covered Press Regulation after Leveson, London: Media Standards Trust, http://
mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Final-Draft-v1-040914.pdf (pp. 73–95)
34. Media Standards Trust (2013) The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO): An Assessment, London: Media 
Standards Trust: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/11/MST-IPSO-Analysis-15–11-13.pdf
35. Media Standards Trust (2019) The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) – Five Years On: A Reassessment, London: 
Media Standards Trust: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MST-IPSO-2019-Final-Version.pdf
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In defiance of Leveson, Parliament and public opinion, IPSO began operating in September 2014. 
Subsequently, Theresa May’s majority Conservative government unilaterally cancelled the second part 
of the Leveson Inquiry and announced in March 2018 that they would not be implementing the legal 
incentives designed to underpin a Leveson-compliant system.36 The public was therefore left with a 
regulatory system covering 90% of national newspapers by circulation that failed to satisfy the majority of 
the recommendations laid out by a year-long public inquiry, and which retained many of the structural 
deficiencies that had been shown to ‘fatally undermine’ the previous system.
The publishers who set up IPSO presented it as a principled adaptation of Leveson, rather than a move to 
bypass it in favour of their own system. An advertisement placed in The Times on 25 October 2013 by the 
Free Speech Network claimed that IPSO would deliver ‘all the key elements Lord Justice Leveson called for 
in his report.’ The ad was subsequently banned by the advertising industry’s self-regulator, the Advertising 
Standards Authority, for including this misleading claim,37 but its intention was clear: to assert that IPSO was 
indeed a concession to the Leveson proposals. 
In their highly selective approach to Leveson’s recommendations, these publishers followed the pattern 
of every previous public intervention in the wake of regulatory failure. But as the following section 
demonstrates, the creation of IPSO marked a different strategy: the bypassing of a public intervention 
endorsed by Parliament in favour of a premeditated industry plan.
EVADING REFORM: THE 2012 INDUSTRY PLAN AND THE 
PRE-EMPTION OF THE LEVESON REPORT
There was an important difference between the Leveson Report and its aftermath and the previous six 
attempts to reform press self-regulation: this time the newspaper industry presented a detailed draft plan 
outlining their own proposed new system. Their proposal was submitted to the Leveson Inquiry in July 
2012 by Lord Guy Black, then chair of the newspaper industry funding body PressBoF38 and former 
Director of the Press Complaints Commission (it is referred to below as ‘the Black plan’). It was produced 
following a period of consultation with newspaper and magazine industry trade bodies39 and submitted to 
the Inquiry in several documents and clarified at an oral hearing.40
The plan allows for a comparison both with the system advocated by Lord Justice Leveson and with the 
articles, regulations and contractual documents that underpin the IPSO system. Since the Black plan 
predates the Leveson recommendations by some months, it is clear that the construction of IPSO post-
Leveson was not a matter of selective adaptation of his recommendations, but a rejection of them in 
36. Walker, Peter (2018) ‘Leveson inquiry: government confirms second stage axed,’ theguardian.com, 1 March 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/media/2018/mar/01/leveson-inquiry-part-2-cancellation-condemned-by-labour-as-breach-of-trust
37. Press Association (2014) ‘Publisher-backed Free Speech Network has “misleading” IPSO ad banned by the ASA,’ pressgazette.
co.uk, 25 June 2014, https://pressgazette.co.uk/publisher-backed-free-speech-network-has-misleading-ipso-ad-banned-asa/
38. Lord Black was appointed a Director of the Regulatory Funding Company, the replacement to PressBoF, in May 2018: 
http://www.regulatoryfunding.co.uk/
39. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 1, Part 1, Paragraph 1.3 (p. 1596) 
40. The relevant documents and oral evidence (9 July 2012) can be accessed at https://web.archive.org/
web/20130513074900/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk:80/evidence/?witness=lord-black
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favour of a predetermined industry plan. This is a substantial change even from the pattern of selective 
reform that followed earlier inquiries. 
Leveson analysed the Black plan in detail across 55 pages in Part K of his Report, comprehensively 
rejecting the vast majority of its components. His report noted that ‘[t]his proposal does not, in its 
current form, meet any of the criteria I set out in May.’41 The broad conclusions were that the proposal 
suffered from a profound lack of independence due to the extensive powers of the new funding body 
(named the Industry Funding Body in the Black plan), including control over the setting of standards.42 
In addition, said Leveson, the proposed system failed on a number of effectiveness criteria: its standards 
and compliance arm, its power to impose remedies and to identify and record code breaches, its 
investigations process, and having insufficient incentives to attract members.43 The further rejection on 
grounds that it was unlikely to cover all significant publishers44 has been borne out by the refusal of the 
Financial Times, Guardian and Independent to participate in the IPSO system. Overall, Leveson said, the 
proposed system prioritised industry interests: 
[T]he proposal is structured entirely around the interests and rights of the press, with no explicit 
recognition of the rights of individuals. The system gives no rights at all to complainants and the 
regulator is set up without any remit to protect the rights of third parties.45
In summary, Leveson concluded that the Black plan failed each of his main criteria for a regulatory 
solution – on effectiveness; fair and objective standards; independence and transparency of enforcement 
and compliance; powers and remedies; and funding. He also drew attention to criticism of the 
independence and effectiveness of the proposed system by victims of press abuse and politicians,46 as well 
as reservations from two serving national newspaper editors.47
He rejected the proposed funding body’s extensive powers, and questioned the need for any such body: ‘In 
my opinion … it would be perfectly possible for the regulator to set its own fees and collect them directly 
41. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 8, Paragraph 8.1 (p. 1648)
42. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 8, Paragraphs 8.7 and 8.13 (pp. 1649–1650)
43. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 8, Paragraphs 8.5, 8.9, 8.11 and 8.12 (pp. 1649–1650)
44. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 8, Paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3 (p. 1649)
45. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 8, Paragraph 8.6 (p. 1649)
46. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 2, Paragraphs 2.36 and 2.37 (p. 1621)
47. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 7, Paragraph 7.5 (p. 1643)
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from its members, taking account of the financial position of the industry.’48 His pointed criticism about 
prioritising industry interests echoed similar comments by Sir David Calcutt about the creation of the 
PCC over 20 years earlier.
COMPARING THE JULY 2012 LORD BLACK PLAN WITH IPSO 
Given Leveson’s comprehensive rejection of the Black plan, a close analysis of the correspondence between 
that plan and IPSO is instructive. This analysis represents the first comprehensive comparison between 
the pre-Leveson industry plan and the industry’s own post-Leveson regulator covering most of the UK’s 
national and regional press by circulation.
The broad outline of the plan set out by Lord Black describes five key features:
1. The creation of a new self-regulatory body, under an independent Trust Board, with greater 
independence from the industry than the PCC and the power to impose fines for particularly 
serious or systemic failures;
2. A contractual relationship between the regulated body and each of the publishers to provide for 
medium term commitment to the system;
3. A continuation of the complaints-handling role of the PCC;
4. The creation of a separate arm of the regulator with powers to investigate serious or systemic failures; and
5. The establishment of a new industry funding body to provide financial stability for the regulatory body.49
The proposal was submitted in four documents comprising a written submission by Lord Black, draft 
Articles of Association, draft Regulations and a draft contractual framework.50
The five key features and documentation match the general outline of the IPSO system. IPSO’s 
contractual system is set out in the Scheme Membership Agreement between Regulated Entities and the 
regulator.51 The new regulatory body – with a standards arm to investigate serious failures, the capacity to 
impose fines, and a continued complaints-handling and mediation system expanding on the PCC system 
– are set out in the Articles52 and Regulations53 of IPSO. The new funding body – the Regulatory Funding 
Company (RFC)54 – was established in parallel, with its own Articles of Association.55
This is a broad-brush comparison (and IPSO has more components and functions than the five features 
48. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 7, Part 4, Paragraph 4.14 (p. 1761)
49. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 2, Part 2, Paragraph 2.1 (p. 1596)
50. Leveson Inquiry (2012) ‘Evidence – witness: Lord Black,’ levesoninquiry.org.uk: https://web.archive.org/
web/20130513074900/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk:80/evidence/?witness=lord-black
51. IPSO (2019) Scheme Membership Agreement, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1813/ipso-scheme-membership-
agreement-2019-v-sep19.pdf
52. IPSO (2019) Articles of Association, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1814/ipso-articles-of-association-2019.pdf
53. IPSO (2019) Regulations, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1815/ipso-
regulations-2019-v-sep19.pdf
54. Regulatory Funding Company (n.d.) ‘Homepage,’ regulatoryfunding.co.uk: http://www.regulatoryfunding.co.uk/
55. Regulatory Funding Company (n.d.) Articles of Association, London: Regulatory Funding Company: http://www.
regulatoryfunding.co.uk/write/MediaUploads/15840651-v1-final_rfc_articles.pdf 
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listed above), but the Leveson Report lists details of the system and discusses them in full.56 As Appendix 1 
of this report shows, the Leveson Report considers 84 separate components57 of the Black plan, broken 
down into seven sections:
¡ Governance and Structures (24 components)
¡ Complaints (15 components)
¡ Standards and Compliance (33 components)
¡ Potential for Growth (1 component)
¡ Funding (3 components)
¡ The Code and the Code Committee (1 component)
¡ The Industry Funding Body (7 components)
APPENDIX 1 contains full details of each component, the paragraphs in the Leveson Report in which they 
were considered, and their presence in the IPSO system alongside the articles in the IPSO documentation 
that demonstrate their inclusion. It also lists whether and where the components were ultimately 
incorporated into the Leveson recommendations or specifically rejected. Table 1 condenses the content 
of Appendix 1 and shows that out of the 84 components of the Black plan assessed by Leveson in his 












24 19 7 15
Complaints 15 11 1 4
Standards and 
Compliance
33 23 7 11
Potential for Growth 1 1 1 0
Funding 3 2 0 2
The Code and the 
Code Committee
1 1 0 1
The Industry Funding 
Body
7 6 0 7
Overall 84 63 (75%) 16 (19%) 40 (48%)
Table 1: Lord Black Plan Components in IPSO and Leveson (figures do not sum to total number of 
components because Leveson did not incorporate or explicitly reject all components. See appendix for details)
56. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 2, pp. 1595–1613
57. Excluding duplicated aspects of the system due to the section summarising the powers of the proposed funding body 
(pp. 1610–1611) and excluding incentives to membership due to their speculative and untested nature in July 2012 (though 
ultimately the ‘kite mark’ incentive was incorporated into both the Leveson recommendations and IPSO).
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The direct link between IPSO and the Black plan is confirmed by the use of identical language in parts 
of both documents. The stated objects of the new regulator proposed by Lord Black in his evidence to 
Leveson read:
The objects of the Company are to carry on activities which benefit the community and in 
particular to promote and uphold the highest professional standards of journalism in the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, including by […] having regard at all times to 
the importance in a democratic society of freedom of expression and the public’s right to know.58
This was rejected by Leveson for its focus on industry interests and the absence of any reference to the 
rights of individuals or the public interest beyond freedom of expression.59 However, the statement of 
IPSO’s objects outlined in Article 5 of its Articles of Association reads:
The objects of the Company are to carry on activities which benefit the community and in particular 
to promote and uphold the highest professional standards of journalism in the United Kingdom, the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, having regard at all times to the importance in a democratic 
society of freedom of expression and the public’s right to know.60
In Annex A of the IPSO Regulations, the clauses setting out the obligatory content to be included by 
regulated entities in their annual statements match those in Lord Black’s proposed plan as reviewed by the 
Leveson Report.61 Specific figures, such as the £1,000,000 or 1% of turnover cap for fines and the £100,000 
fund for investigations (rejected by Leveson for being insufficient) are replicated in the IPSO system, as are 
passages of text from Lord Black’s submitted proposals62 and IPSO’s governance documents.63
As Table 1 shows, Leveson accepted just 16 of the 84 components in the Black plan. Of those 16, only 13 
were included in the final iteration of IPSO after three components were removed prior to IPSO’s launch. In 
all three cases, removal weakened the powers of the regulator or the obligations of its members. Two relate to a 
last-minute industry decision to substitute the phrase ‘serious and systemic’ for the original ‘serious or systemic’ 
in the definition of a systemic failure (a major shift whose implications are explored in Part 2 of this report). 
The third reduced the obligation for a named compliance officer from every title to every publisher.64
58. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 2, Part 2, Paragraph 3.2 (p. 1597)
59. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 3, Part 4, Paragraph 4.7 (p. 1626)
60. IPSO (2019) Articles of Association, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1814/ipso-articles-of-association-2019.pdf (Article 5, p1)
61. Leveson Report Volume IV, Part K, Chapter 2, Part 5, Paragraph 5.3 (p. 1604). A revision of IPSO’s Regulations in 
September 2019 removed several of the obligations that had been present in the 2013 and 2016 iterations of the IPSO 
regulations. The Black Plan content was largely replicated in the 2013 and 2016 documents and some remain in the 
weakened 2019 Annex A: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MST-IPSO-2019-Final-Version.
pdf (Part 3, pp. 5–7)
62. Leveson Inquiry (2012) ‘Evidence – witness: Lord Black,’ levesoninquiry.org.uk: https://web.archive.org/
web/20130513074900/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk:80/evidence/?witness=lord-black
63. IPSO (n.d.) ‘What we do,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/what-we-do/
64. IPSO (2019) Scheme Membership Agreement, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1813/ipso-scheme-membership-
agreement-2019-v-sep19.pdf Clause 3.3.9
IPSO: REGULATOR OR COMPLAINTS HANDLER?  23
While the IPSO system essentially follows the Black plan, it does include some concessions to the Leveson 
Report. Some appointment processes have been amended to reduce the direct influence of the industry 
through the new funding body (the RFC in the IPSO system, the Industry Funding Body in Lord Black’s 
proposal), while the Complaints Committee no longer contains serving editors – a provision rejected explicitly 
by Leveson.65 
In several cases, however, these concessions do not lead to IPSO satisfying the Leveson recommendations 
in full. As noted above, the MST analysis demonstrated that IPSO fails 25 of Leveson’s recommendations 
and passes just 13. A closer analysis of those 13 shows that most were in fact elements of the Black Plan 
that Leveson endorsed and incorporated, rather than outright concessions by the industry to Leveson.
Table 2 (overleaf) shows the Leveson recommendations that IPSO satisfies and their relation to the 
Black plan. Overall, 7 of the 13 relate to components already included in the Black plan and accepted by 
Leveson, and one – relating to the inclusion of a whistleblowing hotline – was suggested to Leveson by the 
then Chair of the Press Complaints Commission, Lord Hunt.66
This analysis further underlines our conclusion that the creation of IPSO was informed considerably 
more by the ready-made plan set out by Lord Black than by industry accommodation of Leveson’s 
recommendations. It shows that even the modest extent to which IPSO satisfies the recommendations set 
out in the Leveson Report is undermined by the knowledge that this accommodation involved very few 
amendments to the industry’s pre-Leveson plan.
65. IPSO (2019) Articles of Association, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1814/ipso-articles-of-association-2019.pdf (Article 22.5)
66. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf, Part K, 
Chapter 2, Part 3, Paragraph 3.14 (p. 1600)
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Leveson 
Rec
Recommendation Description Originally in Black Plan
10
Internal complaint-handling mechanisms to be put in 
place by members for initial consideration of complaints 
prior to escalation to Regulator
Yes (Paragraph 4.2, p1601 of 
Leveson Report)
12
Decisions on complaints ultimately to be the 




No serving editors to be members of the Complaints 
Committee and the Committee composition should 
have a majority of independent members
No
14
It should be the case that complainants are free to bring 
complaints free of charge
Yes (Paragraph 7.1, p1609)
17
The Regulator’s Board should have no powers to 
prevent publication of any material, by anyone, at any 
time
Yes (No pre-publication 
powers set out in Lord Black 
submitted documents)67
23
A new system of regulation should not be considered 
effective if it does not cover all significant news 
publishers
Yes (Paragraph 3.4, p1598)
35
A new regulatory body should consider establishing a 
kite mark for use by members to establish a recognised 
brand of trusted journalism
Yes (Paragraph 10.1, p1611)
37
A regulatory body should be prepared to allow a 
complaint to be brought prior to commencing legal 
proceedings if so advised
Yes (Paragraph 5.13, p1635)
40
A new regulatory body should continue to provide 
advice to the public in relation to issues concerning the 
press and the code, with a service to warn the press
No
41
A new regulatory body should make it clear that 
newspapers will be held strictly accountable for any 
material that they publish, including photographs
No
44
A new regulatory body should consider whether 
it might provide an advisory service to editors on 
consideration of the public interest in taking particular 
actions
Yes (Paragraph 17 of the third 
witness statement of Lord 
Black)68
46
A regulatory body should establish a whistleblowing 
hotline for those who feel they are being asked to do 
things which are contrary to the code
No, but included in Leveson 
on suggestion of PCC Chair 
Lord Hunt
47
Members should include a clause in employment 
contracts preventing journalists being disciplined for 
refusing to act in a manner contrary to the code
No
Table 2: IPSO, the Black plan, and the satisfaction of Leveson’s Recommendations
67. Leveson Inquiry (2012) ‘Evidence – witness: Lord Black,’ levesoninquiry.org.uk: https://web.archive.org/
web/20130513074900/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk:80/evidence/?witness=lord-black
68. Third Witness Statement of Lord Black of Brentwood (9 July 2012). Available at: https://web.archive.org/
web/20121122192823/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/?witness=lord-black (p. 8)
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SUMMARY: REPEATING THE CYCLE BY EVADING 
REFORM
The newspaper industry’s response to the Leveson Inquiry was not – as with previous public 
interventions following systemic failures in press self-regulation – an exercise in cherry-picking 
and selective reform. Instead, the industry itself produced a new system months before any public 
recommendations, based entirely on internal consultations between personnel involved in the 
failed PCC/PressBoF system and the industry itself. In the end, it effectively ignored the judicial 
inquiry in favour of its own system.
IPSO and the industry’s July 2012 draft plan are not exact matches, but the adoption of three-
quarters of the industry’s plan into the IPSO documentation demonstrates a clear lineage between 
the two, as does replication of some passages word for word. That some of the provisions in the 
industry’s plan were accepted by Leveson and then subsequently weakened or effectively removed 
when IPSO’s documents were finalised only amplifies the industry’s indifference to for external 
reform.
Taken in isolation, the refusal of an industry to accept recommendations for reform in response to 
a collapse in standards, produced by a large-scale public inquiry and with widespread political and 
public support, would be troubling. However, the industry’s behaviour in acting both as a lobbyist 
and a propagandist – separately, but with remarkable consistency across multiple companies 
– raises profound concerns about the democratic role of journalism and the legitimacy of the 
industry’s self-imposed regulator.
In the event of further public interventions in this area – which history suggests are almost 
inevitable – any commission or inquiry should consider this analysis when engaging with 
the industry or its regulator. The direct correspondence of the PCC/PressBoF and the IPSO/
RFC systems – including many of the same people and the sharing of personnel between both 
regulatory structures and the industry’s trade bodies – suggests a determination by the industry to 
coordinate efforts and evade any meaningful regulatory reform.
It is perfectly possible that IPSO will perform all of its duties and functions impeccably (though 
Parts 2 and 3 of this report demonstrate clear deficiencies), and that its staff are diligent in 
fulfilling their responsibilities. But the nature of IPSO is decided almost entirely by the governance 
documents that set out its articles, rules and regulations, contractual agreement with its members 
and relationship with the Regulatory Funding Company. These documents were explicitly created 
to evade external reforms designed to reduce industry influence over the regulatory system. 
Without major structural reform – as advocated by Leveson in his comprehensive rejection of 
the industry’s proposed plan – IPSO cannot be anything other than a body that is, as the second 
Calcutt Report eloquently described the PCC/PressBoF system in 1993, ‘set up by the industry, 
financed by the industry, dominated by the industry, and operating a code of practice devised by 
the industry and which is over-favourable to the industry.’
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PART 2 – ENFORCEMENT: STANDARDS 
INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS
KEY POINTS
¡ A last-minute wording change inserted by the newspaper industry ensures that IPSO has almost 
no ability to launch a standards investigation or impose financial sanctions.
¡ IPSO’s inability to deploy a credible enforcement function essentially reduces its regulatory 
powers to that of a complaints-handling body. It does not satisfy the definition of a regulator.
¡ A series of case studies – on IPSO’s response to clear examples of discrimination, inaccuracy 
and journalistic subterfuge – illustrate its lack of power in enforcing journalistic standards.   
STANDARDS INVESTIGATIONS: THE ‘SERIOUS AND 
SYSTEMIC’ BARRIER
As indicated in Part 1, the IPSO mechanism for triggering standards investigations means that the chances 
of an investigation being launched and completed is vanishingly small, and the chance of a member being 
subjected to financial sanction even more so. The Leveson Report identified the key structural failing of 
the Press Complaints Commission system to be the fact that the PCC ‘was not a regulator as that term 
is commonly understood’ and was ‘little more than a complaints-handling body.’69 This explained the 
comprehensive failure of the PCC system, whose capabilities had been misrepresented by the PCC itself 
and the newspaper industry:
Despite the obvious deficiencies in its constitution and make up, the PCC and PressBoF presented 
the self-regulatory system as a whole as if it were a regulator. This self-presentation took the form both 
of explicit assertions and the deliberate adoption of the language of regulation in the description of its 
functions and powers. The effect of this was two-fold. First, it helped to reinforce the perception that 
the press was subject to an effective system of regulation […]. Second, the over-statement of its powers 
weakened the arguments for reform.70  
IPSO’s ability to monitor and enforce standards among its members is therefore key to assessing whether 
it can be evaluated as a regulator ‘as that term is commonly understood’ or whether it remains essentially a 
complaints-handling body. When the new body was set up, the power to initiate standards investigations 
and impose financial penalties for serious breaches was loudly proclaimed by the industry to be a substantial 
 
69. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (p. 1541)
70. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, Volume IV: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf (p. 1542)
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improvement on the PCC. Full-page advertisements were published claiming that IPSO would be ‘the 
toughest [regulator] in the Western world.’71 
In principle, the proposed investigations and sanctions indicated something approaching a genuine 
regulatory body. The wording of IPSO’s Regulations, however, and its record over six years of operation 
between 2014 and 2020 suggest that IPSO’s proposed sanctions are purely notional, and that there is only 
the smallest chance of any investigation being initiated and pursued to completion.
INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS IN THE IPSO REGULATIONS
IPSO Regulation 53 states that the Regulator may require that a Standards Investigation take place if one 
or more of the following criteria are met:
53.1: Where the Regulator reasonably considers that there may have been serious and systemic breaches of 
the Editors’ Code (a Systemic Failure) [emphasis in original];
53.2: Where there has been one or more failure or failures to comply with the requirements of the 
Regulator’s Board;
53.3: In exceptional circumstances, where the Regulator reasonably considers that an investigation is 
desirable because substantial legal issues or Editors’ Code compliance issues are raised about the 
practices of a Regulated Entity or Regulated Entities;
53.4: Where an annual statement identifies significant issues of concern, either in relation to a single 
incident, a Regulated Entity’s compliance processes or a pattern of significant, serial or widespread 
breaches of the Editors’ Code;
53.5: Where, on analysis of statutory authority reports into press standards, in the view of the Regulator there 
have been substantial Editors’ Code compliance issues identified at one or more Regulated Entity.
Crucially, though, only the first criterion invoking ‘serious and systemic breaches’ can attract financial 
sanctions. Paragraph 2 of the IPSO Financial Sanctions Guidance specifies that the Regulator has the 
power to issue fines only if a Regulated Entity has been ‘found to have committed a Systemic Failure (as 
defined in the Regulations).’72 This can therefore only be applied to Regulation 53.1. We address below the 
separate issue of how IPSO’s unannounced last-minute wording change around ‘serious and systematic’ 
has seriously prejudiced its ability to launch an investigation.
Aside from 53.1, the other triggers for a Standards Investigation set out in Regulation 53 do not suggest 
extensive and proactive regulatory powers. Regulation 53.2 allows for an investigation in the event of 
a failure or multiple failures by a Regulated Entity to comply with the Regulator’s requirements, which 
should be a minimum expected function of a regulatory body. Regulations 53.3 and 53.5 allow for an 
investigation on the basis of evidence supplied by external entities (‘legal issues,’ the raising of compliance 
issues, and statutory authority reports) rather than monitoring by the regulator. 
Regulation 53.4 refers to issues of concern raised in annual statements by Regulated Entities. As Part 3 of 
this report shows, however, it is not clear that the information supplied in annual statements could reveal 
such issues of concern, for three reasons. 
71. Press Association (2014) ‘Publisher-backed Free Speech Network has “misleading” IPSO ad banned by the ASA,’ 
pressgazette.co.uk, 25 June 2014: https://pressgazette.co.uk/publisher-backed-free-speech-network-has-misleading-
ipso-ad-banned-asa/
72. IPSO (n.d.) Financial Sanctions Guidance, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1042/financial-sanctions-guidance.docx
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First, Regulated Entities do not supply information on code breaches detected by their internal 
complaints processes, because this information is not recorded. Second, IPSO members in many cases 
supply partial or incomplete information on their compliance processes in their annual statements (see 
Tables 6 and 7 below), and IPSO itself does not supply information on the compliance processes of 
its members in its own annual reports (Table 3, below). Third, it is not clear what a ‘single incident’ 
recorded in an annual statement might look like, since the information on breaches of the Editors’ Code 
recorded by Regulated Entities consists only of a summary of any upheld adjudications by IPSO (by 
definition, previously dealt with by IPSO).73 
THE ORIGIN AND EFFECTS OF ‘SERIOUS AND SYSTEMIC’
The unannounced alteration of IPSO regulations that substantially raised the threshold for a Standards 
Investigation took place between July and October 2013. No reasoning or justification has ever been 
offered for the change.
In July 2012, the industry’s proposal submitted during the Leveson Inquiry (see Part 1 above) included the 
following statement under ‘Powers and remedies’:
[W]here there have been systemic breakdowns in ethical behaviour or internal governance, the Trust 
Board will be able to levy proportionate fines of up to £1,000,000. […] The new Regulator will 
have effective investigatory powers, guaranteed by contracts, to look into serious or systemic ethical 
breakdowns (emphasis added).74
This was produced in response to the Leveson Inquiry’s ‘Draft Criteria for an effective Regulatory Regime’ issued 
in April 2012,75 adopted in the Leveson Report’s final recommendations. Recommendations 18 and 19 state: 
18: The Board, being an independent self-regulatory body, should have authority to examine issues 
on its own initiative and have sufficient powers to carry out investigations both into suspected 
serious or systemic breaches of the code and failures to comply with directions of the Board. Those 
who subscribe must be required to cooperate with any such investigation.
19: The Board should have the power to impose appropriate and proportionate sanctions, (including 
financial sanctions up to 1% of turnover with a maximum of £1m), on any subscriber found to be 
responsible for serious or systemic breaches of the standards code or governance requirements of the 
body […] (emphasis added).76
Volume IV of the Leveson Report – in which the future of press regulation is considered – contains 19 
references to ‘serious or systemic’ breaches, and no references to ‘serious and systemic’ breaches.
In negotiations following the Leveson Inquiry, multiple iterations of Royal Charters were introduced 
73. IPSO Regulations Annex A, Clauses 3.3 and 3.4 – from 2016 version of IPSO Regulations
74. Third Witness Statement of Lord Black of Brentwood (9 July 2012). Available at: https://web.archive.org/
web/20121122192823/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/?witness=lord-black
75. Leveson Inquiry (2011) ‘Draft criteria for a Regulatory Decision,’ levesoninquiry.org.uk: https://web.archive.org/
web/20121025154253/http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Draft-Criteria-for-a-Regulatory-
Solution.pdf
76. Leveson Inquiry (2012) An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Executive Summary, London: The 
Stationery Office: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/229039/0779.pdf
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as vehicles to implement Leveson’s recommendations.77 The first full draft Charter published by the 
Conservative Party in February 2013 refers to investigations and sanctions on the basis of ‘serious or 
systemic’ breaches of the code,78 as did the Charter produced in April 2013 by newspaper publishers 
hoping to forestall the Charter that had been agreed in Parliament in the interim.79 Those same publishers 
ultimately set up the IPSO system, which was first announced on 8 July 2013 with ‘the power to impose 
£1m fines for serious or systemic wrong-doing (emphasis added).’80
Between this initial announcement of IPSO and publication of the first comprehensive documents 
outlining IPSO’s Articles and Regulations on 23 October 2013, this wording was changed to ‘serious and 
systemic’ (Regulation 40.1 of IPSO’s original Regulations).81 
The substitution of a single word in this instance has a transformative impact on the ability of IPSO 
to hold its members to account. It substantially raises the threshold for a Standards Investigation, with 
profound implications for the effectiveness of IPSO as a regulatory body. 
At a stroke, the re-worded statement doubles the number of criteria that must be met before IPSO can 
launch a Standards Investigation. Nowhere in the governance documents of IPSO are the definition of 
‘serious’ or ‘systemic’ breaches specified. Both concepts are therefore separately contestable by any regulated 
entity that is the subject of a standards investigation. 
It is not clear what would need to occur in order for ‘serious and systemic’ breaches of the code to be recorded. 
Short of a comprehensive breakdown of standards there is a degree of mutual exclusivity inherent in the term. 
A single incident representing a high-profile or well-publicised code breach with implications for public life, 
for example, is not likely to be defined as ‘systemic,’ while a consistent pattern of low-level breaches indicating 
poor observance of aspects of the Editors’ Code would be unlikely to be determined as ‘serious’ breaches.
IPSO has explicitly stated that it sees no difference between the two definitions, claiming in a November 
2019 statement that ‘IPSO does not agree that there is a significant difference between “serious or 
systemic” and “serious and systemic”: both imply serious wrongdoing at a publisher.’82 No evidence 
was adduced to support this assertion, nor any explanation offered for the original change of wording. 
IPSO does not acknowledge the manifest consequence that two criteria must now be fulfilled to launch a 
standards investigation, neither of which are defined in its documentation and each of which is potentially 
contestable by the subject of a proposed investigation. The net result is that this wording change 
significantly hampers the regulator’s power to be proactive in exercising proper regulatory oversight. 
77. Media Standards Trust (2013) ‘The Story of Eight Charters,’ mediastandardstrust.org, 20 June 2013: http://
mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/the-story-of-eight-charters/
78. UK Government (2013) Draft Operative Provisions for a Royal Charter: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136347/RC_Draft_Royal_Charter_12_February_2013.pdf 
(Schedule 3, Clauses 18 and 19)
79. Press Standards Board of Finance(2013) Draft Royal Charter for the Independent Self-Regulation of the Press: http://
privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Press-Standards-Board-of-Finance-Ltd-Petition-and-
Draft-Charter.pdf (Schedule 3, Clauses 18 and 19)
80. Newspaper Society (2013) ‘Independent Press Standards Organisation,’ newspapersoc.org.uk, 8 July 2013: https://
web.archive.org/web/20130716082254/http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/08/jul/13/independent-press-standards-
organisation
81. IPSO (2013) Regulations: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/IPSO-Regulations-Oct-13.pdf 
82. IPSO (2019) ‘Response to the Media Standards Trust report,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1841/response-to-
the-media-standards-trust-report.pdf
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In practice, IPSO has not instigated a standards investigation in over six years of operation from 2014 to 
the present, despite several high-profile code breaches involving one or more of its member publications. 
IPSO’s failure in this respect can be illustrated by three case studies. Each one is summarised below, with full 
details outlined in Appendix 2.
STANDARDS INVESTIGATIONS IN PRACTICE: CASE 
STUDIES
Case Study 1: Discrimination (Clause 12) 
Clause 12 of the Editors’ Code states that:
I. The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s race, colour, religion, sex, 
gender identity, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability.
II. Details of an individual’s race, colour, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, physical or mental 
illness or disability must be avoided unless genuinely relevant to the story.83
It is clear from IPSO statements and adjudications that it applies this clause only to individuals making 
complaints about language directed specifically at them, and that it stands aside when its members use 
inflammatory language about groups of people. As IPSO itself acknowledges, ‘stories that criticise groups 
or report them in a bad light’ can have an impact upon those groups and on society as a whole, but – short 
of hate crime legislation – there is no avenue of redress for those groups.84
In April 2015, the Sun published an opinion piece by Katie Hopkins in which – among other things – she 
described migrants as ‘cockroaches’ and ‘a plague of feral humans,’ advocating the use of military gunships to 
stop them.85 The article led to over 400 complaints to IPSO and a petition calling for Hopkins’ column to be 
removed by the Sun which attracted over 300,000 signatures;86 it also provoked a response from the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner, who cited ‘anti-foreigner abuse’ and ‘incitement to hatred’ in the British press as an area 
of concern.87 IPSO rejected all complaints about the article on the grounds of Clause 12 (Discrimination) and 
investigated one complaint on the grounds of Clause 1 (Accuracy). The ruling noted that the article could not 
have been in breach of Clause 12 of the code because no identifiable individual was criticised.88 
IPSO is powerless to change its own code, because the Editors’ Code is controlled by the Regulatory Funding 
Company.89 This was underlined by IPSO’s then Chair, Sir Alan Moses, in June 2016, when he acknowledged 
83. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (2021) ‘The Code in Full,’ editorscode.org.uk: https://www.editorscode.org.uk/the_code.php
84. Buckingham, John (2018) ‘IPSO Blog: How Clause 12 (Discrimination) works,’ ipso.co.uk, 16 March 2018: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/news-press-releases/blog/ipso-blog-how-clause-12-discrimination-works/
85. Usborne, Simon (2015) ‘Katie Hopkins has just written a piece so hateful that it might give Hitler pause – why was it 
published?’ independent.co.uk, 20 April 2015: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/katie-hopkins-when-is-enough-
enough-10186490.html
86. Change.org (n.d.) ‘Remove Katie Hopkins as a Columnist’: https://www.change.org/p/the-sun-newspaper-remove-katie-
hopkins-as-a-columnist
87. BBC (2015) ‘Tackle tabloid “hate speech”, UN commissioner urges UK,’ bbc.com, 24 April 2015: https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-32446673
88. IPSO (2015) ‘02741–15 Greer v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 20 July 2015: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-
statements/ruling/?id=02741–15
89. Under the IPSO system, the code is the property of the Editors’ Code of Practice Committee, a subcommittee of the 
Regulatory Funding Company (IPSO Articles, Schedule 1.23). Amendments to the code can be proposed only by the 
code of Practice Committee, of which 10 of 15 members represent publishers, three are independent lay members, and 
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that he was unable to exert influence on the Editors’ Code Committee in relation to Katie Hopkins’ 
comments, a situation that ‘seemed … absolutely to demonstrate a certain impotence in regulation.’90 
Another high-profile discrimination case arose with a column on 18 July 2016 by the Sun columnist and 
former editor Kelvin MacKenzie criticising Channel 4 News for having Muslim presenter Fatima Manji 
present a report on a terrorist attack in France while wearing a hijab. The column prompted over 2,000 
complaints to IPSO, including one from Manji herself, as well as criticism from Channel 4 News and the 
National Union of Journalists.91 IPSO rejected the complaints, arguing that while the article did mention the 
complainant as an individual, the reference was relevant and a legitimate expression of the author’s opinion.
At the time of writing, the complaints statistics page on the IPSO website has been disabled.92 Prior 
to its removal, the searchable database indicated the extent to which Clause 12 lies almost outside the 
regulator’s powers. An analysis in September 2019 found that, of 16,317 complaints received by the 
regulator between October 2014 and December 201893 in which Clause 12 was raised, only two were 
upheld.94 Over half (8,605) were deemed to be outside the regulator’s remit, and a further 6,807 were 
rejected. Overall, therefore, almost 95% of all Clause 12 complaints were not considered by the regulator 
at all (a further 768 were not pursued by the complainant). For comparison, of complaints citing Clause 
1 (Accuracy), around 80% of 22,723 complaints were not considered and just under 1% were upheld.95 
In response to an open letter from a combination of Parliamentarians, civil society groups and public 
figures criticising ‘racist and faith-based attacks against communities,’96 IPSO’s Chair confirmed 
that IPSO’s role is confined to recording breaches of the Editors’ Code.97 His statement effectively 
acknowledged that, as the code is currently written, it is almost impossible for members of IPSO to 
breach Clause 12 without publishing discriminatory information about a named individual who then 
brings a complaint personally to IPSO. In the meantime, IPSO can neither change the code despite 
the remaining two places are reserved for the Chair and Chief Executive of IPSO (https://www.editorscode.org.uk/
about_us.php). The regulator therefore has only minimal control over any amendments to the code. In the event of a 
proposed code amendment, the Regulatory Funding Company has the power to veto the amendment (Article 10.11) and 
the publisher members of IPSO can reject the amendments following a vote (Article 10.11.2).
90. The Media Society (2016) ‘Sir Alan Moses, IPSO Chair at Media Society Summer Drinks,’ https://soundcloud.com/user-
932454463/sir-alan-moses-ipso-chair-at-media-society-summer-drinks (13:36–14:43)
91. Plunkett, John (2016) ‘Katie Hopkins’ migrants column was in bad taste – but IPSO doesn’t cover that,’ theguardian.co.uk, 
28 July 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/28/katie-hopkins-migrants-ipso-sun-cockroaches
92. IPSO (n.d.) ‘Complaints Statistics,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/complaints-
statistics/ (accessed 16 May 2021); information on rulings continues to be available.
93. IPSO’s statistics for 2019 at that time appeared to be incomplete, recording only 11 complaints including Clause 12 
between January and July.
94. IPSO (2015) ‘00572–15 Trans Media Watch v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 5 May 2015: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-
resolution-statements/ruling/?id=00572–15; IPSO (2018) ‘18685–17 Evans v The Argus (Brighton),’ ipso.co.uk, 12 January 
2018: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=18685–17
95. The inclusion of multiple cited clauses in IPSO complaints means that it is difficult to clarify where Clause 12 in isolation 
was unsuccessful, but of the 20 upheld complaints between 2014 and 2019 of which Clause 12 was part of the complaint, 
in all but one of the cases (mentioned above) the part of the complaint about Clause 12 was not upheld (Retrieved from 
IPSO rulings (https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/), search parameters: all upheld complaints from 
October 2014 to July 2019 including ‘Clause 12’ in code provisions).
96. Hacked Off (n.d.) ‘Demand IPSO protect targeted groups against press discrimination,’ hackinginquiry.org: https://web.
archive.org/web/20200511224528/https://hackinginquiry.eaction.org.uk/discrimination-ipso
97. Walker, James (2019) ‘Senior politicians accuse UK press regulator of “turning a blind eye” to racism in the media,’ 
pressgazette.co.uk, 28 February 2019: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/senior-politicians-accuse-uk-press-regulator-of-
turning-a-blind-eye-to-racism-in-the-media/
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its own stated reservations, nor record the breaches of the code that would be necessary to launch an 
investigation on the grounds of ‘serious and systemic’ breaches in this area.
Case Study 2: Accuracy and The Times ‘Muslim foster care’ story 
This high profile 2017 story attracted two external analyses in 2019 – by former journalists Brian Cathcart 
and Paddy French,98 and by BBC journalists in Radio 4’s 11 October episode of The Corrections.99
Both alleged serious shortcomings in newsgathering procedures and reporting by The Times over a series 
of stories about the placing of a child in foster care by Tower Hamlets Borough Council. The story gained 
nationwide prominence and details were repeated by multiple IPSO members. The prominence of the 
story, the subject matter, and the allegations of systemic flaws in the fact-gathering process should have 
made this story a legitimate and appropriate focus for investigation by a regulatory body tasked with 
policing standards. 
Details are given in Appendix 2, but both investigations found that a series of facts available to the 
journalist but omitted from the story undermined the story’s central focus and resulted in a misleading 
headline and report. These included the facts that the child was considered to be in immediate danger 
when taken into care by the police; that the child’s mother had alcohol and substance abuse issues; that 
the child’s court-appointed guardian had reported that the child was ‘well cared for’; and that, to the 
satisfaction of all parties, arrangements were in hand for the girl to live with her maternal grandmother, 
who was Muslim.
IPSO handled one complaint from Tower Hamlets Borough Council in relation to a follow-on story 
published by The Times on 30 August 2017, but did not consider any of the more than 250 substantive 
complaints about inaccuracies in the original 28 August story. In reply to Cathcart and French, IPSO said: 
‘Without the involvement of an individual in the position to know the facts of this case, we considered 
that it would be difficult to effectively investigate the alleged inaccuracies.’100
Serious allegations of inaccuracy from two forensic and independent analyses in such a high-profile 
and emotive case would surely dictate a Standards Investigation from an effective regulator. But the 
terms of IPSO’s Regulation 53 relating to serious and systemic breaches would have rendered such an 
investigation virtually impossible. 
Case Study 3: Subterfuge and IPSO’s quasi-investigation
On 27 September 2014 a Conservative government minister, Brooks Newmark, pre-emptively resigned 
before publication the following day of a story outlining inappropriate behaviour towards a supposed 
young Conservative activist via private messages on social media.101 It quickly transpired that the story, 
98. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting 
– A Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_
Unmasked.pdf
99. BBC Radio 4 (2019) The Corrections – The Carbonara Case, 11 October 2019: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
m000950v
100. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting 
– A Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_
Unmasked.pdf (page 53)
101. Moss, Vincent and Matthew Drake (2014) ‘Tory minister Brooks Newmark quits over sex scandal,’ mirror.co.uk, 27 
September 2014: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/tory-minister-brooks-newmark-quits-4335398
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written by a journalist acting in a freelance capacity and published by the Sunday Mirror, was the result 
of a months-long investigation in which multiple Conservative or former Conservative MPs had been 
targeted by the (male) journalist using a fake social media account to pose as a young female Conservative 
activist, using images of real women without their permission.102 
The journalist engaged in text conversations with Newmark over an extended period, culminating in 
an exchange of sexually explicit images. This exchange formed the basis of the story, and prompted 
Newmark’s resignation. Another MP also targeted as part of the investigation, Mark Pritchard, 
complained to IPSO alleging a breach of Clause 10 of the Editors’ Code.103 The relevant part of Clause 
10 states that ‘Engaging in misrepresentation or subterfuge, including by agents or intermediaries, can 
generally be justified only in the public interest and then only when the material cannot be obtained 
by other means.’104 A finding that the investigation was a ‘fishing expedition,’ as alleged in Pritchard’s 
complaint (in other words, that it was speculative and not based on information), would have 
constituted a breach of the code. A number of other concerns were raised about the story, detailed in 
Appendix 2.
The Sunday Mirror quickly reached a confidential settlement with Pritchard, which involved a donation 
to charity and closure of his complaint to IPSO.105 As a result, IPSO has no record of the nature of the 
(withdrawn) complaint.
Despite the withdrawal of the complaint, IPSO decided to proceed with a semi-official inquiry. It 
did not invoke any of the Regulation 53 clauses, almost certainly because the issue in question did 
not meet the very high threshold for a formal investigation – particularly when there was no formal 
complaint on which to adjudicate. Instead, it launched an ad hoc inquiry that was retroactively 
legitimised by a revision to its regulations two years later.106 Given this inquiry’s lack of formal status, 
in the event of IPSO finding the Sunday Mirror guilty of a code breach, it would have had no powers 
to sanction the publication.
In fact, IPSO found that the Sunday Mirror was justified in using subterfuge and that publication was in 
the public interest.107 Both the ruling itself and the conduct of its investigation raised a number of issues, 
not least the fact that the Sunday Mirror provided incomplete information on its newsgathering process, 
and that at least two other newspapers (the Sun and the Mail on Sunday) had rejected the story. 
102. Waterson, Jim and Alan White (2014) ‘Swedish model upset after her Instagram selfie was used by Sunday Mirror to bring 
down Brooks Newmark,’ buzzfeed.com, 27 September 2014: https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/brooks-newmark-
resignation#36cp4wh)
103. Patrick Wintour, Alexandra Topping and Josh Halliday (2014) ‘MP refers Sunday Mirror to police and press regulator over 
sex sting,’ theguardian.co.uk, 29 September 2014 : https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/29/sunday-mirror-
complaint-ipso-press-regulator-sex-sting
104. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (2021) ‘The Code in full,’ editorscode.org.uk: https://www.editorscode.org.uk/the_
code.php
105. Greenslade, Roy (2014) ‘Why did the Sunday Mirror settle with Tory MP who complained to IPSO,’ theguardian.co.uk, 22 
October 2014: https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/22/sundaymirror-ipso
106. IPSO (2016) ‘IPSO announces new rules and regulations,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/news-press-releases/press-
releases/ipso-announces-new-rules-and-regulations/ ‘IPSO now has the explicit power – in appropriate circumstances – 
to investigate in the absence of a complain [sic]’
107. Julian, Vikki (2015) ‘Brooks Newmark Sunday Mirror case: IPSO decision,’ ipso.co.uk, 26 March 2015: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/news-press-releases/news/brooks-newmark-sunday-mirror-case-ipso-decision/
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Whatever the outcome, it was clear that IPSO was forced to finesse its own rules in order to mount 
any kind of inquiry, and that the power invested in it by Section 53 remains ineffectual. If any further 
evidence were needed, the lack of a single Standards Investigation throughout IPSO’s history illustrates 
the impotence of its powers in this area. 
SUMMARY: COSMETIC CHANGE WITH SERIOUS 
IMPLICATIONS
The addition of investigatory and monitoring functions and the ability to impose meaningful 
sanctions were key to ensuring that, post-Leveson, the UK public would have recourse to a 
genuine regulator rather than an ineffectual complaints-handling regime of the kind operated by 
the Press Complaints Commission. The Leveson Report deemed such powers to be essential to the 
definition of ‘an independent self-regulatory body.’ 
Ostensibly, the IPSO framework provides for such powers. However, on proper examination, 
it is clear that the Regulatory Articles are drafted in such a way as to reduce such powers to the 
point that they become almost worthless. It remains unclear why representatives of IPSO, in 
public statements that in many ways echo those of the Press Complaints Commission, defend 
those parts of its constitutional documents that significantly limit its own powers.108 The ‘serious 
and systemic’ formulation inserted at the last minute into IPSO’s regulations by industry 
representatives significantly raises the bar by which an investigation may be proactively 
launched, and thus weakens a core regulatory function.
It is still possible for the ‘serious and systemic’ definition to be tested but – as the case studies 
outlined here demonstrate – even in very high-profile cases IPSO either lacks the ability to 
intervene (as with discrimination) or has elected not to do so even when presented with significant 
evidence of potential wrongdoing. Whether its inaction is due to an intentionally high bar 
imposed by the industry when drafting IPSO’s regulations, or to institutional resistance by IPSO 
itself, a power that remains unused whatever the circumstances is as redundant as a power that 
cannot be invoked. Both outcomes suggest that IPSO in its current form cannot call itself ‘a 
regulator as that term is commonly understood.’ It is in that respect virtually no different from the 
discredited PCC.
108. IPSO (2019) ‘Response to the Media Standards Trust report,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1841/response-to-
the-media-standards-trust-report.pdf
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PART 3 – MONITORING, COMPLAINTS-
HANDLING AND TRANSPARENCY
KEY POINTS
¡ IPSO does not record code breaches in members’ internal complaints processes; it therefore 
cannot effectively monitor compliance with the Editors’ Code.
¡ There are significant problems in how IPSO’s complaints-handling balances interests of 
members against those of complainants.
¡ IPSO’s annual reports do not fully satisfy their own regulations: they fail to include 
information on the adequacy and effectiveness of members’ compliance processes.
¡ Several IPSO members – including one of the largest local publishers – do not supply 
sufficient information on their websites for members of the public to make an informed 
complaint.
¡ Published annual statements by IPSO members fail to satisfy regulatory obligations, despite 
IPSO acknowledging that reform in this area was needed. 
A vital characteristic of any effective regulator is that it has access to accurate and relevant data on whether 
regulated entities are abiding by agreed codes of conduct, and that it provides rigorous and transparent 
information on its own regulatory performance and that of the publishers it regulates. On both counts, 
IPSO falls short. This section looks first at IPSO’s ability to perform an adequate monitoring and 
complaints-handling role; and then at how member publishers and IPSO itself perform on issues of 
transparency and public access to relevant information. 
MONITORING AND COMPLAINTS-HANDLING
Regulation 5 of the IPSO Regulations sets out the primary functions of the Regulator as: 
¡ Handling complaints about breaches of the Editors’ Code (Regulation 5.1); and 
¡ Monitoring and investigating issues of standards and compliance with the Editors’ Code  
(Regulation 5.2). 
There are therefore two components of the IPSO complaints-handling process to be evaluated: the 
effectiveness of IPSO’s decision-making processes when assessing potential breaches of its code; and 
to what extent it is able to record sufficient information for its monitoring role, in particular whether 
there may be significant gaps in its record of probable breaches of its code. These are covered here in 
reverse order.  
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SERIOUS GAPS IN COMPLAINTS MONITORING
There are two obstacles to IPSO’s ability to perform an adequate monitoring function. First, there is no 
detailed record of complaints made to Regulated Entities, and therefore no means of assessing potential 
code breaches before complaints are resolved or not pursued. Second, IPSO’s Regulations allow for a 
number of exemptions by which complaints escalated to the regulator are not recorded as having breached 
the code. Each of these is dealt with in turn.
Failure to Record Code Breaches in Regulated Entities’ Internal 
Complaints-Handling
As recommended by the Leveson report, complainants must first go through a member publication’s 
internal complaints process; IPSO is only engaged if, once that internal process has been exhausted, the 
complainant remains unsatisfied.
However, IPSO does not require members to record or publish any information on their own internal 
complaints statistics; nor does it publish an annual summary of internal compliance systems (this 
is covered in more detail below). As a result, it is difficult to see how IPSO can effectively monitor 
compliance with the Editors’ Code or identify where there might be potentially serious standards issues.
A good example is Associated Newspapers’ 2019 annual statement. Under the paragraph ‘Details of other 
incidents’ the publisher states:
Any complaints which arrive outside the IPSO system are normally settled without admission of 
liability. Although they are investigated internally, they do not go through an independent process 
of investigation and adjudication, so it would be unfair to both the complainants and the journalists 
involved to offer a view on whether there was a breach of the Code in individual cases. In addition 
some complainants choose not to use the services of IPSO because they prefer to resolve their 
complaint with us privately, and we must respect that.109
Thus, if complaints are resolved or abandoned before being escalated to IPSO, there is no  
mechanism by which actual or potential code breaches can be recorded and IPSO has no power  
to compel members to keep such a record, even on a confidential basis. This removal of potentially  
thousands of complaints from regulatory scrutiny actually represents a reduction in regulatory 
powers compared to the old PCC; it creates an entire tranche of complaints alleging possible  
code breaches about which the regulator has no knowledge. As we illustrate in more detail  
below, it means that IPSO cannot provide information on the internal compliance processes  
of its members.
Disregarding Code Breaches in the IPSO Complaints Process
As well as being unable to monitor complaints and potential code breaches by member publishers, IPSO’s 
own complaints-handling process provides a number of exemptions which excuse it from recording a code 
breach even if one has taken place.
109. Associated Newspapers (2019) Annual statement to the Independent Press Standards Organisation 2019, ipso.co.uk: 
https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1877/associated-newspapers-annual-statement-2019_for-pub.pdf (p. 9)
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IPSO Regulation 52.2 (on the complaints statistics to be published by the regulator as part of its annual 
reports) sets out the following criteria by which complaints will not be regarded as substantive and will 
therefore be excluded from any records:
¡ [Those which] are not pursued by the complainant;
¡ Are rejected under Regulation 12 [having been deemed not to fall under the Regulator’s remit or not to 
disclose a possible breach of the Editors’ Code];
¡ Are disposed of by agreement between the complainant and the Regulated Entity outside of the 
complaints process and duly notified in accordance with Regulation 39; or
¡ Are considered closed under Regulation 40 by the Regulator or Complaints Committee following an 
offer by the Regulated Entity of a remedial measure.
Regulation 40 reads as follows:
If a Regulated Entity offers a remedial measure to a complainant which the Regulator or, if applicable, 
the Complaints Committee considers to be a satisfactory resolution of the complaint, but such measure 
is rejected by the complainant, the Regulator or, if applicable, the Complaints Committee shall notify the 
complainant of the same and that, subject to fulfilment of the offer by the Regulated Entity, it considers 
the complaint to be closed and a summary of the outcome shall be published on the Regulator’s website.
In practice, therefore, Regulation 40 allows IPSO to close a complaint without recording a code breach 
even if one has taken place, and even when the complainant has not accepted an offer of resolution by 
the publisher. 
While there may be legitimate reasons for not including data on complaints that were voluntarily dropped 
or deemed to be outside the code, there is no good reason to exclude complaints on the second two criteria 
of Regulation 52.2 where clear breaches of the code have occurred. Combined with IPSO’s inability to 
collect reliable data on complaints first submitted to publishers and dealt with internally, it is difficult to 
see how the public can have any faith in its ability to monitor industry compliance effectively.
IPSO’S COMPLAINTS-HANDLING
There are also concerns about IPSO’s apparent inclination to side with publishers over complainants, first 
raised in a 2015 Hacked Off report which looked at a number of cases in IPSO’s first year of operation.110 
Similar concerns have been raised since, and three examples are presented in Appendix 6. Each of these is 
summarised briefly below:
¡ BELCHER V THE TIMES (APRIL 2019).111 IPSO concluded that a quote manufactured by a 
publisher did not break its code on accuracy because it represented a ‘summation’ of the journalist’s 
interpretation of advice by activists. 
110. Hacked Off (2015) The Failure of IPSO: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/the-failure-of-IPSO.pdf
111. IPSO (2019) ‘07454–18 Belcher v The Times,’ ipso.co.uk, 15 March 2019: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-
statements/ruling/?id=07454–18
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¡ TOWER HAMLETS BOROUGH COUNCIL V THE TIMES (APRIL 2018).112 Although accepting that 
the main thrust of a story about the Borough’s placement of a child into foster care was distorted, IPSO 
accepted the newspaper’s case that highly relevant information was omitted to avoid identification of 
a child. Subsequent investigations which exposed the report’s inaccuracy have corrected the record 
without compromising the child’s identity.
¡ PREVENT WATCH V SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (JULY 2016).113 IPSO dismissed all complaints of 
inaccuracy by a group identified by the newspaper as ‘Muslim extremists’ and which described two 
named individuals as Islamist activists. In a subsequent libel case, one of the named individuals received 




IPSO is obliged to publish an annual report with information as outlined in Regulation 52 (below).
Regulation 52 largely transcribes recommendation 21 of the Leveson Report, with some minor changes to 
wording and the addition of exemptions for recording complaints.
While for the most part IPSO fulfils the obligations set out in its own Regulations, in one significant 
respect it does not. Regulation 52 sets out nine separate areas that IPSO is obliged to cover in its Annual 
Reports:
1. Identity of Regulated Entities
2. Significant change in the number of Regulated Entities
3. Number of articles in relation to which the Regulator has handled substantive complaints
4. The outcomes reached in aggregate for all the Regulated Entities
5. The outcomes in relation to each Regulated Entity
6. Summary of any Standards Investigations carried out
7. The outcomes of such investigations
8. Report on the adequacy and effectiveness of Regulated Entities’ compliance processes
9. Information about the Arbitration Service, including the extent to which it has been used
Excluding numbers 6 and 7 relating to Standards Investigations (since there have been none), this leaves 
seven areas. Table 3 below shows the extent to which each of the five Annual Reports available at the time 
of writing covers each one.114 In four out of seven areas IPSO does provide the necessary information, 
112. IPSO (2018) ‘20480–17 Tower Hamlets Borough Council v The Times,’ ipso.co.uk, 5 April 2018: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=20480–17
113. IPSO (2016) ‘00615–16 Prevent Watch v The Sunday Telegraph,’ ipso.co.uk, 15 July 2016: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-
and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=00615–16
114. A detailed breakdown of information used to determine whether or not each Annual Report fulfilled these obligations is 
included in Appendix 4.
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where applicable. Significant changes in membership were not relevant until 2019 when several additional 
members joined IPSO.
IPSO supplies information on identities of Regulated Entities each year, but there are discrepancies 
between the publishers listed in IPSO’s Annual Reports and the list of annual statements published by 
IPSO each year. Thus, IPSO’s information in this case is not fully accurate.
This leaves one important area where none of the IPSO Annual Reports has yet contained any 
substantive information: the adequacy and effectiveness of publishers’ compliance processes. In this 
respect IPSO’s Annual Reports have not been compliant with its own Regulations.
REGULATION 52
52 Each year, the Regulator shall publish an annual report which shall include:
52.1. The identity of the Regulated Entities and a record of any significant change in the 
number of Regulated Entities
52.2. The number of articles in relation to which the Regulator has handled substantive 
complaints and the outcomes reached, both in aggregate for all the Regulated Entities and 
in relation to each Regulated Entity; provided that for these purposes complaints which:
52.2.1. Are not pursued by the complainant;
52.2.2. Are rejected under Regulation 12*, that is, where IPSO determines that a complaint is 
either outside its remit or does not represent a possible breach of the Editors’ Code;
52.2.3. Are disposed of by agreement between the complainant and the Regulated Entity outside 
of the complaints process and duly notified in accordance with Regulation 39 [giving 
IPSO the power to consider such complaints closed]; or
52.2.4. Are considered closed under Regulation 40 [where IPSO’s Complaints Committee 
can consider a complaint closed when the remedial measure offered to a complainant 
by a Regulated Entity is deemed to be acceptable by IPSO, even if rejected by the 
complainant] by the Regulator or Complaints Committee following an offer by the 
Regulated Entity of a remedial measure.
 Shall not be regarded as substantive complaints;
52.3. A summary of any Standards Investigations carried out and the outcome of such 
investigations;
52.4. A report on the adequacy and effectiveness of the compliance processes and procedures 
adopted by the Regulated Entities; and
52.5. Any information about the Arbitration Service, including the extent to which the 
Arbitration Service has been used.
*  Regulation 12 reads: ‘Subject to Regulation 11 [which sets the time limit after publication of an article within which a 
complaint about that article can be accepted], on receipt of a complaint, the Regulator shall review the complaint to 
ensure that (a) it falls within the Regulator’s remit; and (b) discloses a possible breach of the Editors’ Code. If the Regulator 
is not satisfied that the complaint should proceed, it shall write to the complainant to explain why and shall reject the 
complaint. A complainant can ask the Regulator to review any rejection decision, but must make this request within 7 days 
of receiving written confirmation of rejection. The Regulator may re-open the complaint following such review.’
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Table 3: IPSO’s Annual Statements and the Fulfilment of Regulation 52
115. IPSO (2016) Annual Report 2015, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1300/ipso-ar.pdf
116. IPSO (2017) Annual Report 2016, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1462/ar_2016_.pdf
117. IPSO (2018) Annual Report 2017, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1569/ipso_annual_report_2017e.pdf
118. IPSO (2019) Annual Report 2018, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1823/ipso-annual-report-2018.pdf
119. IPSO (2020) Annual Report 2019, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1968/ar_2019_.pdf
120. Listed publishers in 2018 Annual Report: 80; No. of annual statements submitted in 2018: 76
121. Listed publishers in 2019 Annual Report: 88; No. of annual statements submitted in 2019: 76
IPSO: REGULATOR OR COMPLAINTS HANDLER?  41
TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLISHERS
Information for Complainants – Desktop and Mobile
The IPSO system follows the Leveson recommendation that members of a regulatory system should have 
their own internal complaints-handling mechanism to which complainants should first be directed.122 
The Scheme Membership Agreement between IPSO and its members obliges each Regulated Entity 
to ‘implement and maintain effective and clear procedures for the reasonable and prompt handling of 
complaints.’123
While neither the Leveson recommendations nor the IPSO Regulations outline detailed obligations about 
the requisite information or the process itself – beyond the benefits of displaying a ‘kite mark’ to establish 
‘a recognised brand of trusted journalism’124 – it should be a basic function of an effective regulatory system 
to ensure that such information is both accessible and clear. 
In order to assess whether potential complainants were given access to sufficient information on the IPSO 
system and the internal complaints processes at IPSO members, the desktop sites of a range of local, 
regional and national newspaper members were analysed for the following information:
¡ The presence of a badge signifying IPSO membership on the title’s homepage
¡ The presence of a ‘how to complain’ link, or equivalent, on the title’s homepage
¡ An external direct link to the Editors’ Code of Practice or details of the Code within the site
¡ Details of how the internal complaints process operates
¡ Information on internal complaint procedure timelines
¡ An external link to the IPSO website
Table 4 shows how a selection of different titles provide this information online. With the exception of the 
i newspaper, the websites of the UK’s national newspapers regulated by IPSO generally provide sufficient 
information for potential complainants, with links to both IPSO and the Editors’ Code. The Daily Mail 
and Sun sites do not – as of February 2021 – include the IPSO badge on their homepage, and while the 
Sun site includes a dedicated page for its internal complaints process, there is no information setting out 
timelines for complainants.125
Some larger regional and local publishers regulated by IPSO – accounting for a significant proportion of 
the UK’s local newspapers – are much less likely to provide information on their complaints processes or to 
direct potential complainants to IPSO. While Reach Regionals provides the same complaints information 
as its national titles, JPI Media publications (owned from January 2021 by National World) provide very 
122. Leveson Inquiry (2012) Executive Summary and Recommendations, London: The Stationery Office: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229039/0779.pdf 
(Recommendation 10; p33)
123. IPSO (2019) Scheme Membership Agreement, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1813/ipso-scheme-membership-
agreement-2019-v-sep19.pdf (p. 4)
124. Leveson Recommendation 35; IPSO Regulation 5.7
125. The Sun (2016) ‘Editorial Complaints,’ thesun.co.uk, 6 June 2016: https://www.thesun.co.uk/editorial-complaints/
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little information on either the title’s internal complaints procedures, or information about the IPSO 
system. Four titles explored for this study – the Yorkshire Post, the Lancashire Evening Post, the Morpeth 
Herald and the Buxton Advertiser – all included a short section of text in the ‘contact us’ section of the 
website stating that the title is a member of IPSO, and that complaints about inaccuracy or intrusion 
should be addressed to the editor. They gave IPSO’s postal address, phone number and inquiries email 
address, but no hyperlinks or direct links to the IPSO site.126
Newsquest, which publishes over 200 local daily and weekly newspapers, also applies a consistent site 
template in both its larger and smaller titles. However, the Newsquest sites reviewed for this analysis contain 
no information for users on their internal complaints mechanisms. Moreover, while information on the 
publisher’s membership of IPSO includes a link purporting to lead to information on how to complain to 
the editor, it actually leads to the site’s contacts page that in some cases contains no such information.127 
Smaller independent local newspaper publishers Barnsley Chronicle Ltd and Wyvex Media (publisher of 
the Arran Banner as well as other West of Scotland titles) also had limited information on how complaints 



















Daily Mail No128 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Daily Star Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Express Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
i No No No No No No
Mirror Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sun No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Telegraph Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Times Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LARGE LOCALS
JPI/NW – Large 
City Titles129
Yes No No No No No
JPI/NW – Smaller 
Titles130
Yes No No No No No
126. Appendix 5 contains an example of a complaints policy and procedure statement at JPI/National World title.
127. For example, the contacts page for the Glasgow Times, one of Newsquest’s large city newspapers, contains no 
information that could be used to submit a complaint electronically: https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/contact/. The 
Penarth Times, covering a smaller community in South Wales, follows the same template, though the contacts page 
in that instance includes an email address for the editor (but no information on internal complaints processes (see 
Appendix 5).
128. All information in this table gathered February 2021
129. Sampled titles: the Yorkshire Post and Lancashire Evening Post
130. Sampled titles: the Morpeth Herald and the Buxton Advertiser
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Newsquest – 
Glasgow Times
Yes No No No No Yes
Newsquest – 
Penarth Times
Yes No No No No Yes
Reach Regionals Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDEPENDENT LOCALS
Barnsley Chronicle No No No No No Yes
Wyvex Media – 
Arran Banner
Yes No No No No No
Table 4: Public-Facing Regulatory Information by Selected IPSO Members
Within the IPSO system, therefore, individual publishers and titles provide varying levels of information 
for potential complainants. Generally the national newspaper websites – the i excluded – comply with 
basic requirements, while Newsquest and JPI Media/National World among regional publishers provide 
very little information beyond supplying contact details for editorial staff and for IPSO.
Provision of relevant information on member publishers’ mobile apps is also patchy.131 Table 5 shows 
that, of the mobile apps of all eight national newspaper publishers regulated by IPSO, three contain 
no in-app information about internal complaints processes. The Daily Mail (MailOnline) app has no 
complaints function at all, requiring a user to follow menus through ‘settings,’ ‘general,’ ‘send us feedback’ 
and ‘editorial feedback’ only to be faced with the option to open an auto-generated blank email. The 
MailOnline app also contains no reference or link to IPSO. The Sun Mobile app only allows the user to 
generate a blank email through the ‘make a complaint’ function accessed through the ‘contact us’ option 
on the app’s main menu, and also contains no mention of IPSO. The app for the i newspaper contains no 
information on internal complaints processes, and mentions IPSO only in a mobile version of its desktop 
information page (which has no links to the IPSO site or the Editors’ Code).
Title
Information on Internal 
Complaints132
Information about or links to 
IPSO
Daily Mail/Mail Online No No
Daily Star Yes Yes
Express Yes Yes
Mirror Yes Yes




Table 5: Public-Facing Regulatory Information on Mobile Apps of IPSO’s National Newspaper Members
131. The Android versions of apps are tested here.
132. All information verified 2 February 2021
44  IPSO:  REGULATOR OR COMPLAINTS HANDLER?
Publishers of local news sites perform worse than their national counterparts, with the exception of 
those published by Reach Plc, which follow the same template as Reach’s national titles. The apps for 
Newsquest’s Glasgow Times, for example, includes no references to complaints mechanisms, nor do 
the Yorkshire Post or Lancashire Evening Post, owned by JPI Media before the publisher’s purchase by 
National World.
As UK news audiences increasingly favour smartphone over desktop access to online news,133 the 
absence of relevant information to potential complainants on a number of mobile apps is a significant 
shortcoming. 
Annual Statements of Regulated Entities
In September 2019 IPSO made adjustments to Annex A of its Regulations (relating to the content 
of members’ annual statements). The most recent submitted annual statements at the time of writing 
(covering the calendar year of 2019) are the first to have been compiled under the new guidelines. Previous 
analysis has shown that these changes amounted to a significant relaxation of the obligations for IPSO’s 
members, leading to a likely reduction in the quality of information made available to the public.134 This 
section will assess the extent to which IPSO’s members meet the new (post-September 2019) obligations 
in their 2019 annual statements, and conclude with a comparison with compliance figures from 2017, 
when the previous regulations were in effect.
Regulation 5.2.1 of IPSO’s updated Regulations135 states that a specified function of the Regulator is ‘the 
monitoring of compliance with the Editors’ Code including through the provision by Regulated Entities 
of annual statements.’ Regulations 43–46 in the ‘Standards and Compliance’ section of the Regulations 
also indicate that these annual statements form a core aspect of IPSO’s monitoring role. These Regulations 
set out obligations for publishers to submit annual statements by a specified date and for IPSO to publish 
those statements on its website.
Information to be included in each publisher’s annual statements are specified in Annex A of IPSO’s 
Regulations. As of September 2019, each annual report must include:
2. Copies of any internal manuals, codes or guidance used by journalists
3. Brief details of the compliance process, including how the Regulated Entity deals with:
3.1 Compliance with the Editors’ Code;
3.2 Any adverse findings of the Regulator and steps taken to address such findings;
3.3 Training of staff
4. Details of the steps taken by the Regulated Entity in response to any adverse adjudications by the 
Regulator during the previous year
 
133. Newman, Nic, Richard Fletcher, Antonis Kalageropoulos and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen (2019) Reuters Institute Digital News 
Report 2019, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/
files/2019–06/DNR_2019_FINAL_0.pdf (p. 69)
134. Media Standards Trust (2019) The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) – Five Years On, London: Media 
Standards Trust: http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/MST-IPSO-2019-Final-Version.pdf (p. 19)
135. Corresponding to Regulation 4.2.1 in the 2013 and 2016 iterations of IPSO’s Regulations.
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National Publisher
Annex A Clause
2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4
Associated Newspapers136 Yes Partial Yes Yes No
News UK & Ireland137 No No Partial Yes No
Reach Plc138 No Partial Yes Yes No
Telegraph Media Group139 Yes No Yes Yes No
Table 6: IPSO’s National Newspaper Members’ Annual Statements and Fulfilment of Annex A (2019)
Table 6 shows to what extent the 2019 annual statements from IPSO’s national publishers satisfy the stipulated 
disclosure criteria (supporting evidence is listed in Appendix 4). While all members provide information on 
relevant staff training, none provide full information on their titles’ compliance with the regulatory system. 
Two publishers – News UK & Ireland and Telegraph Media Group – do not include any figures on the 
number of complaints dealt with via internal compliance processes, and none of the publishers provide 
information on whether and how often their internal complaints processes detected breaches of the 
standards code. The Associated Newspapers statement includes the claim that ‘it would be unfair to both 
the complainant and the journalists involved to offer a view on whether or not there was a breach of the 
Code in individual cases.’ 
Similarly, the Reach Plc statement says that ‘Complaints that are received by Reach Plc either through 
its Complaints Form or from IPSO are recorded and assessed with regard to whether the Code has 
been engaged and which clauses have been addressed.’ Code breaches are not mentioned and appear 
not to be recorded. News UK & Ireland and Telegraph Media Group make no mention of code 
breaches in internal complaints.
Publishers’ annual statements were recorded as fulfilling a clause if the required information was included in full  
or where detailed descriptions of the relevant processes were included. They were recorded as ‘partial’ if information 
was incomplete, and as not fulfilled if there was no supporting evidence or the issue was not mentioned. 
Taking one publisher as an example, the statement supplied by News UK & Ireland (publisher of the 
Sun, The Times and Sunday Times and the Times Literary Supplement) complies with Annex A to the 
following extent:
¡ (Clause 2) – Does not include any internal manuals within its publicly accessible statement. It does 
refer (page 12) to an e-learning module introduced in 2019, but without any details: Not fulfilled
136. Associated Newspapers (2019) Annual statement to the Independent Press Standards Organisation 2019, ipso.co.uk: 
https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1877/associated-newspapers-annual-statement-2019_for-pub.pdf
137. News UK (2019) News Corp UK & Ireland Limited’s IPSO Annual Statement 2019, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1916/news-uk-ipso-annual-statement-2019_for-pub.pdf
138. Reach Plc (2019) Annual Statement to the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), ipso.co.uk: https://www.
ipso.co.uk/media/1926/reach-plc-2019-ipso-annual-statement-2019_for-pub.pdf
139. Telegraph (2019) IPSO Annual Report 2019, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1936/telegraph-annual-
statement-2019_for-pub.pdf
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¡ (Clause 3.1) – Pages 9–11 list all complaints in which IPSO was involved, but provide no data on 
complaints handled by internal processes. There is thus no information on code breaches or compliance 
within each title: Not fulfilled
¡ (Clause 3.2) – The lists of complaints handled by IPSO on pages 9–11 include all instances where 
IPSO produced adverse findings. Because these are presented only as URLs, there is no information 
about the nature of complaints or their outcomes. These lists are accompanied by limited information 
on steps taken in response: Partially fulfilled
¡ (Clause 3.3) – Pages 12–13 outline staff training across all publications: Fulfilled
¡ (Clause 4) – No information is included on changes made in response to adverse findings by IPSO in 
the previous year: Not fulfilled
Table 7 provides the same information for larger publishers of local newspapers and specialist news outlets 
(such as current affairs magazines in the case of the Spectator and national titles in the case of the Jewish 
Chronicle). In their 2019 annual statements, none of the sampled publishers included details on their 
compliance with the Editors’ Code in terms of statistics on internal complaints handled or recorded code 
breaches. In many cases the publishers included a statement committing to the observance of the code, but 
this was not supported by information on how internal complaints-handling systems performed. 
Regional/Specialist News
Annex A Clause
2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4
Archant Yes No Yes Yes No
DC Thomson Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Highland News & Media No No N/A140 Yes No
Iliffe Media No No N/A No No
Irish News N/A141 No N/A Yes No
Jewish Chronicle Yes No Yes Yes No
Johnston Press No No Yes Yes No
MNA Yes No Yes Yes No
Newsquest Media Group No No Yes Yes No
The Spectator N/A No Yes No No
TES Global Ltd No No N/A No No
Tindle Newspapers No No Yes Yes No
Wyvex No No N/A Yes No
Table 7: IPSO’s Regional Members’ Annual Statements and Fulfilment of Annex A (2019)
IPSO’s own internal review of its operations, The Pilling Review, acknowledged in 2016 that this lack 
of information in annual statements represented a shortcoming and recommended that IPSO should 
140. ‘N/A’ denotes the fact that the publisher did not incur any adverse findings from IPSO in 2019
141. ‘N/A’ is used here when the publisher states that no training manuals are used beyond the Editors’ Code
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consider ‘requiring the publishers to record and include in the annual statements data about the number 
of complaints received by the publisher that were not dealt with by IPSO, and the outcome.’142 IPSO 
committed to reviewing this recommendation with members, but its revised Regulations in September 
2019 made no change in this respect. We must therefore assume that IPSO, or its members (or perhaps 
the Regulatory Funding Company), have rejected this recommendation. 
There is no consistency in the level of detail provided by IPSO members.143 The annual statement of the 
Spectator in 2019 consisted of a three-page document missing much of the information requested in Annex 
A.144 The Regulated Entity in this instance publishes a national news magazine with a turnover in 2019 of 
over £14 million and declared print circulation of over 88,000 with over 2 million annual unique online 
users.145 Conversely, Newbury News Limited (turnover of £2.2 million in 2018)146 which publishes two 
small local papers in Berkshire, supplied in 2019 a five-page document with considerably more detail.147
IPSO’s September 2019 revisions to its Regulations148 amount, in practice, to a scaling-back and 
simplification of the obligations for publishers. Prior to the change, member publishers were obliged to 
include the following information each year:
2. Copies of any internal manuals, codes or guidance used by journalists
3. Brief details of the compliance process, including how the Regulated Entity deals with:
3.1 Pre-publication guidance under Regulation 4.5;
3.2 Verification of stories;
3.3 Compliance with the Editors’ Code, including any adverse findings of the Regulator and steps taken 
to address such findings;
3.4 Editorial complaints which the Complaints Committee determines under Regulation 27;
3.5 Training of staff
4. Details of the steps taken by the Regulated Entity in response to any adverse adjudications by the 
Regulator during the previous year
Three criteria were removed by the changes (on pre-publication guidance, verification of stories, and 
the recording of complaints on which the IPSO Complaints Committee determined a code breach). Of 
the three, one (on Complaints Committee determinations) is a constructive simplification, as this may 
be covered under ‘adverse findings’ in the new Clause 3.2. The other two changes simply remove the 
obligation for publishers to supply information.149
142. Pilling, Joseph (2016) The External IPSO Review, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/media/1278/ipso_review_online.pdf (Paragraph 126, p31)
143. Clause 5 of Annex A states that, when considering the level of detail to be included in a publisher’s annual statement, 
it will take into account ‘its size, the number of staff employed, number of publications, circulation figures of the 
publication(s) and annual turnover.’ How this is applied is not clear.
144. Spectator (2019) The Spectator annual statement 2019, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1933/spectator-
statement-for-2019_for-pub.pdf
145. From Companies House (Annual Report 2019) 
146. From Companies House (Annual Report 2018) 
147. Newbury News & Media (2019) Annual IPSO Report 2019, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1915/newbury-news-
annual-statement-2019_for-pub.pdf
148. Fenech, Hanno (2019) ‘Press regulator announces changes to its rules and regulations,’ ipso.co.uk, 17 September 2019: https://
www.ipso.co.uk/news-press-releases/press-releases/press-regulator-announces-changes-to-its-rules-and-regulations/
149. There is no information on whether ‘compliance with the Editors’ Code’ should cover internal complaints, and the overlap 
between Clause 4 and the new Clause 3.2 (previously part of 3.3) remains.
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IPSO has not published the reasoning behind this change, noting only that the revision of its regulations 
include ‘[s]etting out specific requirements about what should be included in publishers’ annual 
compliance statements to IPSO.’ The end result suggests a reduction in transparency given that less 
information is likely to be made available to the public.
SUMMARY: BLIND SPOTS IN MONITORING AND 
OPACITY IN TRANSPARENCY
Documentary evidence suggests that IPSO is structurally unable to fulfil a comprehensive 
monitoring role via its recording and handling of complaints, and fails to satisfy the transparency 
commitments laid down in its own governance documents. 
Shortcomings in IPSO’s complaints-handling functions demonstrate the system’s inability to 
monitor effectively the industry it is supposed to hold to account. Moreover, its failure to obtain 
or publish any information about the extent of code breaches handled in members’ own internal 
complaints processes – a problem noted and criticised by its own internal review – further 
diminishes IPSO’s ability to assess compliance of its members with the standards it purports to 
be policing. It is also hampered by its own regulations which specify various circumstances where 
code breaches cannot be recorded.
In terms of IPSO’s own transparency initiative – publication of annual reports summarising its 
own activities and those of its members – IPSO does not provide all the information called for in 
its own regulations. In particular, the absence of information on the ‘adequacy and effectiveness 
of the compliance processes and procedures adopted by the Regulated Entities,’ as required by 
Regulation 52 of IPSO’s own governing documents, severely limits any meaningful assessment of 
its performance. 
Just as IPSO itself fails to fulfil all its transparency commitments, so do its members. While 
the websites of most national newspapers contain relevant information and links for potential 
complainants, this material is less readily available across the hundreds of local newspapers 
published by the UK’s largest regional publishers. A lack of relevant information on some 
members’ mobile apps is an additional oversight. IPSO members are also inconsistent in the 
extent to which their annual statements fulfil information obligations, with regional publishers in 
particular underperforming.
Among Leveson’s criteria for an independent and effective regulatory system was the stipulation that 
it must be deemed credible and effective by the public. Leveson further specified that enforcement 
of standards should command public respect and ‘compliance … should be transparent and 
demonstrable to the public.’ The analysis in Part 3 demonstrates that the IPSO system is not 
equipped to monitor industry compliance with the Editors’ Code, and does not fully satisfy its 
own commitments to transparency, undermining any claims to both effectiveness and therefore 
credibility. Perhaps more importantly, the absence of adequate monitoring powers demonstrates 
that IPSO, like the PCC before it, cannot satisfy the definition of a regulator.
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APPENDIX 1 – IPSO REPLICATION OF 2012 
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150. From Volume IV of the Leveson Report, Part K (‘Regulatory Models of the Future’). Chapter 2 (pp. 1595–1613) sets out 
the plan submitted by Lord Black: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/270943/0780_iv.pdf
151. As set out in Part L of Volume IV (pp. 1803–1809)
152. Chapter 3 of Part K (pp. 1614–1650) consists of Leveson’s appraisal of Lord Black’s plan.
153. IPSO (2019) Articles of Association, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1814/ipso-articles-of-association-2019.pdf
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154. Regulatory Funding Company (n.d.) Articles of Association, London: Regulatory Funding Company: http://www.
regulatoryfunding.co.uk/write/MediaUploads/15840651-v1-final_rfc_articles.pdf 
155. IPSO (2019) Scheme Membership Agreement, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1813/ipso-scheme-membership-
agreement-2019-v-sep19.pdf
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Complaints
Complaints Committee 
to decide whether 
code breach has taken 
place





action has been taken 
in case of a breach
4.6 Yes Regulation 30 No No N/A
Complaints
If remedied, outcome 
may be published 
on the Regulator’s 
website
4.6 Yes Regulation 40 No No N/A
Complaints
If not remedied, the 
Committee will make 
a public ruling and 
the company will be 
obliged to publish it 
‘with due prominence’
4.6 Yes Regulation 30 No N/A N/A
Complaints
Regulator’s Board 
has no powers to 
insist on location or 
prominence of an 
adjudication




Regulator has no 
power to award 
compensation or 
levy a fine unless 
an investigation is 
triggered
4.8 Yes Regulation 30 No No N/A
Complaints
The complainant will 
have the right within 
14 days to appeal the 
decision, to confirm or 
refer the decision back 
to the Committee with 
a different decision
4.9 Yes Regulation 32 No N/A N/A
Complaints
The reviewer will be 
appointed by the 
Regulator’s Board, 
cannot be a member 
of the Complaints 
Committee or 












Ad hoc Investigations 
and Compliance Panel 








Panel and 53 
gives some of 
the functions to 
the Regulator
No No N/A






Panel to make 
recommendations to 
the board on basis of 
monitoring functions
5.2 No









Annual statement to 
















































on any incidents 
involving code or 
regulatory breaches, 










content: details of 
the steps taken in 












publication of annual 
statements




Regulator to review 
annual reports through 
Head of Standards and 
Compliance
5.5 No










Requirement for a 
named compliance 















Regulator has own 
proactive powers of 
investigation





trigger: ‘where it 
appears there have been 
significant systemic 










trigger: ‘where serious 
breaches of the criminal 
law have been found by 
the courts’





trigger: ‘where annual 
certification identifies 
significant and 
substantive issues of 
concern’




Board of Regulator 
to decide remit and 
terms of reference 
for an investigation, 
inform subject and take 
response into account




Regulator’s Board must 
appoint an Investigation 
Panel (3 people; 2 
public representatives 
and 1 industry 
representative)






answers and access to 










investigations to be 
referred to the Board 
of the Regulator; 
Board can use legal 
proceedings to compel 
specific performance
5.12 Yes Regulation 62 No Yes
Para 5.25, 
p1627





of the investigation, 
a report is submitted 
to the subject with a 
28-day deadline for a 
written response, after 
which a meeting takes 
place






The meeting will hear a 
presentation from the 
Head of Standards and 
Compliance
5.14 No











At the meeting the 
panel can request 
further work or reach a 
preliminary conclusion 











The decision is to be 
sent in draft to the 
subject, who has 14 
days to make comments 











Subject can request 
a review of the final 
decision on basis of 
a flawed process or 
decision; if accepted, 
a Review Panel will 
be created with no 













Review Panel would 
consider all existing 
and any new evidence; 
subject has 14 days 













Review Panel will reach 
a final decision against 














not be aware of any 
investigation until a final 
decision is published
5.19 Yes Regulation 63 No Yes
Para 5.21, 
p1636




The decision of the 
Investigation Panel 
or – if applicable – the 
Review Panel, and the 











Sanctions: ‘to reprimand 
the subject of the 
investigation’ (may 
concern publication 















a ‘systemic failure’ 












for fines to be set 
at 1% of turnover 














determined by: nature 
of entity; nature of 
failure; inadvertent or 
deliberate; aggravating 
factors; adjustments 
for deterrence; and 













Board can require the 
regulated entity to 
make a contribution to 
costs
5.25 Yes Regulation 66.3 No N/A N/A
Potential for 
Growth
Arbitral arm to be 
added
6.1 Yes Clause 5.4 SMA Yes No N/A
Funding
Fully funded by industry 
through membership 








Funding body to publish 
a list of members and an 
annual record of funding 
proportions
7.4 No N/A No N/A N/A
156. IPSO (n.d.) Financial Sanctions Guidance, ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1042/financial-sanctions-guidance.
docx 
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157. Pilling, Joseph (2016) The External IPSO Review, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/media/1278/ipso_review_online.pdf
158. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (n.d.) ‘About us,’ editorscode.org.uk: https://www.editorscode.org.uk/about_us.php
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APPENDIX 2 – STANDARDS INVESTIGATIONS CASE 
STUDIES
Case Study 1: Discrimination (Clause 12) – IPSO’s inability to act due to the 
RFC’s ownership of the Editors’ Code
Since IPSO opened in 2014 the nature of Clause 12 of the Editors’ Code which deals with 
Discrimination, and the circumstances in which it does not apply, have been a continuous source of 
controversy for certain IPSO members and for the regulator itself. The Clause itself is concise:
III. The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual’s race, colour, religion, sex, 
gender identity, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability.
IV. Details of an individual’s race, colour, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, physical or mental 
illness or disability must be avoided unless genuinely relevant to the story.159
The codebook accompanying the code, however, adds the caveat that ‘the Code does not cover generalised 
remarks about groups or categories of people. This would inhibit debate on important matters, would 
involve subjective views and would be difficult to adjudicate upon without infringing the freedom of 
expression of others.’160
The balance between expression and restraint is difficult for media regulators to police, and the distinction 
between harm and offence is fundamental to free speech in democratic society. But the combination of 
IPSO’s codebook caveat and its limited response to complaints and high-profile incidents means that the 
regulator effectively plays no role when its members use inflammatory language about groups of people. 
As IPSO itself acknowledges, ‘stories that criticise groups or report them in a bad light’ can have an impact 
upon those groups and on society as a whole, but – short of hate crime legislation – there is no avenue of 
redress for those groups.161
IPSO’s first major test in this area came in April 2015, when then-columnist for the Sun Katie Hopkins 
published an opinion piece in the midst of a general election campaign in which – among other things 
– she described migrants as ‘cockroaches’ and ‘a plague of feral humans,’ advocating the use of military 
gunships to stop them.162 The article led to over 400 complaints to IPSO and a petition calling for 
Hopkins’ column to be removed by the Sun which attracted over 300,000 signatures;163 it also provoked 
a response from the UN Human Rights Commissioner, who cited ‘anti-foreigner abuse’ and ‘incitement 
to hatred’ in the British press as an area of concern.164 IPSO rejected all complaints about the article on 
159. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (n.d.) ‘The Code,’ editorscode.org.uk, https://www.editorscode.org.uk/the_code.php
160. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (2021) The Editors’ Codebook: The handbook to the Editors’ Code of Practice, 
London: The Regulatory Funding Company: https://www.editorscode.org.uk/downloads/codebook/codebook-2019.pdf 
(p. 96 – accessed 22 March 2021)
161. Buckingham, John (2018) ‘IPSO Blog: How Clause 12 (Discrimination) works,’ ipso.co.uk, 16 March 2018: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/news-press-releases/blog/ipso-blog-how-clause-12-discrimination-works/
162. Usborne, Simon (2015) ‘Katie Hopkins has just written a piece so hateful that it might give Hitler pause – why was it 
published?’ independent.co.uk, 20 April 2015: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/katie-hopkins-when-is-enough-
enough-10186490.html
163. Change.org (n.d.) ‘Remove Katie Hopkins as a Columnist’: https://www.change.org/p/the-sun-newspaper-remove-katie-
hopkins-as-a-columnist
164. BBC (2015) ‘Tackle tabloid “hate speech”, UN commissioner urges UK,’ bbc.com, 24 April 2015: https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-32446673
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the grounds of Clause 12 (Discrimination) and investigated one complaint on the grounds of Clause 
1 (Accuracy). The ruling noted that the article could not have been in breach of Clause 12 of the code 
because no identifiable individual was criticised.165 In doing so it was acting entirely in line with the rules 
and regulations governing the regulator.
Unfortunately, even if IPSO believed the code to be inadequate in this respect, it is powerless to change 
it. Despite the Leveson recommendation that the standards code governing members would be the 
responsibility of the regulator’s Board, under the IPSO system it is controlled by the Regulatory Funding 
Company; IPSO is restricted to an extremely limited role in effecting reforms or changes.166
In the case of the Sun column the then Chair of IPSO, Sir Alan Moses, demonstrated the regulator’s lack 
of power in a public address to the Media Society in June 2016, where he acknowledged that he did not 
believe that Clause 12 works in practice, but that as only ‘one of twelve’ on the Code Committee he was 
unable to exert influence on the Committee in relation to Katie Hopkins’ comments, a situation that 
‘seemed … absolutely to demonstrate a certain impotence in regulation.’167
Developments since IPSO ruled on the Sun column on migrants have shown that discrimination 
continues to be both an area of public concern and an issue that IPSO seems to acknowledge as a 
fundamental problem. Coverage of the EU Referendum campaign by IPSO members in May and June 
2016 was found to have contained widespread negative coverage of migrants of different nationalities, 
including the use of dehumanising language and stereotyping and widespread associations with criminality 
and constraints on public spending.168 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
reported in October 2016 that ‘[h]ate speech in some traditional media, particularly tabloid newspapers, 
continues to be a problem, with biased or ill-founded information disseminated about vulnerable groups, 
which may contribute to perpetuating stereotypes.’169 Announcing the report, the Chair of the ECRI 
stated ‘It is no coincidence that racist violence is on the rise in the UK at the same time as we see worrying 
examples of intolerance and hate speech in the newspapers, online and even among politicians.’170
Between the referendum and the ECRI report, another high-profile discrimination case arose with a 
column on 18 July 2016 by the Sun columnist and former editor Kelvin MacKenzie criticising Channel 
165. IPSO (2015) ‘02741–15 Greer v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 20 July 2015: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-
statements/ruling/?id=02741–15
166. Under the IPSO system, the code is the property of the Editors’ Code of Practice Committee, a subcommittee of the 
Regulatory Funding Company (IPSO Articles, Schedule 1.23). Amendments to the code can be proposed only by the 
Code of Practice Committee, of which 10 of 15 members represent publishers, three are independent lay members, 
and the remaining two places are reserved for the Chair and Chief Executive of IPSO (https://www.editorscode.org.uk/
about_us.php). The regulator therefore has only minimal control over any amendments to the code. In the event of a 
proposed code amendment, the Regulatory Funding Company has the power to veto the amendment (Article 10.11) and 
the publisher members of IPSO can reject the amendments following a vote (Article 10.11.2).
167. The Media Society (2016) ‘Sir Alan Moses, IPSO Chair at Media Society Summer Drinks,’ https://soundcloud.com/user-
932454463/sir-alan-moses-ipso-chair-at-media-society-summer-drinks (13:36–14:43)
168. Moore, Martin and Gordon Ramsay (2017) ‘Brexit and discrimination in the UK press,’ in John Mair, Tor Clark and Neil 
Fowler (eds.) Brexit, Trump and the Media, Bury St Edmunds: Abramis (see also: https://www.inpublishing.co.uk/articles/
brexit-and-discrimination-in-the-uk-press-551)
169. Council of Europe (2016) ECRI Report on the United Kingdom (fifth monitoring cycle), European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-united-kingdom/16808b5758 (Paragraph 40, Page 18)
170. BBC (2016) ‘Human rights report warns over “anti-foreigner sentiment”,’ bbc.com, 4 October 2016: https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-politics-37539281
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4 News for having Muslim presenter Fatima Manji present a report on a terrorist attack in France while 
wearing a hijab. The column drew criticism from Manji – who complained, unsuccessfully, to IPSO under 
three code clauses, including Clause 12 on Discrimination – from Channel 4 News, the National Union 
of Journalists, and prompted over 2,000 complaints to the Regulator.171 In its ruling, IPSO stated again 
that Clause 12 does not cover ‘prejudicial or pejorative references to a particular religion’ and claimed that 
while the article did mention the complainant as an individual, the reference was relevant and a legitimate 
expression of the author’s opinion:
17. The article did refer to the complainant. But it did so to explain what triggered the discussion 
about a subject of legitimate debate: whether newsreaders should be allowed to wear religious 
symbols. In the Committee’s view, the columnist was permitted to identify what prompted his 
discussion, rather than merely raising it in the abstract. Furthermore, he was entitled to express 
his view that, in the context of a terrorist act which had been carried out ostensibly in the name of 
Islam, it was inappropriate for a person wearing Islamic dress to present coverage of the story.172 
The Complaints Committee’s decision on Clause 12 is contestable and arguably makes significant 
interpretations in favour of the columnist, but the nature of the case clarifies the narrowness of the 
grounds on which IPSO can record a code breach on grounds of discrimination, particularly in comment 
pieces. The episode also produced an almost farcical coda when IPSO Board member and fellow Sun 
columnist Trevor Kavanagh was obliged to apologise to the regulator after supporting MacKenzie’s claims 
about Manji in another column for the Sun, published while her complaint was being considered by the 
Regulator’s Complaints Committee.173
At the time of writing the complaints statistics page on the IPSO website has been disabled.174 Prior to the 
removal of the page, the searchable database indicated the extent to which Clause 12 lies almost outside the 
regulator’s powers. A preliminary analysis in September 2019 found that, of 16,317 complaints received 
by the regulator between October 2014 and December 2018175 in which Clause 12 was raised, only one 
was upheld.176 Over half (8,605) were deemed to be outside the regulator’s remit, and a further 6,807 were 
rejected. Overall, therefore, almost 95% of all Clause 12 complaints were not considered by the regulator 
at all (a further 768 were not pursued by the complainant). For comparison, of complaints citing Clause 1 
(Accuracy), around 80% of 22,723 complaints were not considered and just under 1% were upheld.177 
171. Plunkett, John (2016) ‘Katie Hopkins’ migrants column was in bad taste – but Ipso doesn’t cover that,’ theguardian.co.uk, 
28 July 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/28/katie-hopkins-migrants-ipso-sun-cockroaches
172. IPSO (2016) ‘05935–16 Manji v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 29 September 2016: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-
statements/ruling/?id=05935–16
173. Ponsford, Dominic (2017) ‘IPSO board rebuke for Sun’s Trevor Kavanagh as complaint against him is upheld,’ 
pressgazette.co.uk, 24 February 2017: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/ipso-board-rebuke-for-suns-trevor-kavanagh-as-
complaint-against-him-is-upheld/
174. IPSO (n.d.) ‘Complaints Statistics,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/complaints-
statistics/ (accessed 8 February 2021); information on rulings continues to be available.
175. IPSO’s statistics for 2019 at time of writing appear to be incomplete, recording only 11 complaints including Clause 12 
between January and July.
176. IPSO (2015) ‘00572–15 Trans Media Watch v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 5 May 2015: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-
resolution-statements/ruling/?id=00572–15
177. The inclusion of multiple cited clauses in IPSO complaints means that it is difficult to clarify where Clause 12 in isolation 
was unsuccessful, but of the 20 upheld complaints between 2014 and 2019 of which Clause 12 was part of the complaint, 
in all but one of the cases (mentioned above) the part of the complaint about Clause 12 was not upheld (Retrieved from 
IPSO rulings (https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/), search parameters: all upheld complaints from 
October 2014 to July 2019 including ‘Clause 12’ in code provisions).
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IPSO as an organisation has acknowledged publicly that there is a problem with Clause 12. From January 
2018 the regulator began to publish the results of ‘Clause 12 monitoring,’ whereby the regulator publishes 
quarterly summaries of all cases where more than 10 complaints citing Clause 12 have been received. 
The accompanying statement acknowledges that ‘cases where IPSO received more than ten complaints 
tend to raise broader issues around editorial standards.’178 The statistics show 28 cases between January 
2018 and June 2019 in which more than 10 complaints have been received. The analyses contain little 
more information than the nature of the complaint and the reason why it was deemed not to be a code 
breach.179 
IPSO’s wider Editorial Standards Monitoring – in which IPSO looks at a sample of all complaints closed 
each quarter – noted in its January to April 2019 release in response to a factually incorrect article about 
Muslim immigrants in France that ‘[t]he reporting of Islam is a priority for IPSO this year. Guidance for 
journalists will be published later this year.’180 The regulator’s monitoring functions – both of editorial 
standards as a whole and of Clause 12 – therefore note that there are systematic issues with how the 
regulatory system can deal with discrimination, even to the point of voluntarily allocating resources to a 
Clause 12 monitoring function. The monitoring, however, consists of little more than signposting that 
there is a problem.
Finally, an open letter signed in March 2019 by a combination of Parliamentarians, civil society groups, 
academics and public figures, and coordinated by the Media Diversity Institute and The Hacked Off 
Campaign criticised ‘Racist and faith-based attacks against communities.’181 The statement in response by 
IPSO’s Chair confirmed that IPSO’s role is confined to recording breaches of the Editors’ Code.182
That statement effectively acknowledges that, as the code is currently written, it is almost impossible for 
members of IPSO to breach Clause 12 without publishing discriminatory information about a named 
individual who then brings a complaint personally to IPSO. While the single upheld Clause 12 case was 
brought by a civil society group, it was acting with the consent of the named individual.183 IPSO’s inability 
to influence the code, despite public admissions that there are problems with how groups have been 
portrayed by members and the creation of a monitoring system for the operation of Clause 12, means that 
there will be no change in this area unless the Regulatory Funding Company wishes it. As such, IPSO will 
not be recording the code breaches that would be necessary for any decision about ‘serious and systemic’ 
breaches in this area to be made.
178. IPSO (n.d.) ‘Clause 12 monitoring,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/monitoring/clause-12-monitoring/
179. In 17 cases this was because a group and not an individual was mentioned, in nine cases the complaints were invalid 
because they were made by third parties, and the remaining two cases consisted of one where the issue allegedly being 
discriminated against is not covered by Clause 12 and one where the analysis is incomplete (https://www.ipso.co.uk/
media/1700/clause-12-oct-to-dec1.pdf – Case headline ‘Prison Service apologises for sending transgender rapist to 
women’s prison’)
180. IPSO (2019) ‘Quarterly analysis of standards themes arising,’ ipso.co.uk: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1703/standards-
themes-q1-2019.pdf
181. Hacked Off (n.d.) ‘Demand IPSO protect targeted groups against press discrimination,’ hackinginquiry.org: https://web.
archive.org/web/20200511224528/https://hackinginquiry.eaction.org.uk/discrimination-ipso
182. Walker, James (2019) ‘Senior politicians accuse UK press regulator of “turning a blind eye” to racism in the media,’ 
pressgazette.co.uk, 28 February 2019: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/senior-politicians-accuse-uk-press-regulator-of-
turning-a-blind-eye-to-racism-in-the-media/
183. IPSO (2015) ‘00572–15 Trans Media Watch v The Sun,’ ipso.co.uk, 5 May 2015: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-
resolution-statements/ruling/?id=00572–15
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Case Study 2: Times ‘Muslim foster care’ story – IPSO inaction despite multiple 
external investigations highlighting issues
This 2017 story became a particularly high-profile case that subsequently attracted two external analyses in 
2019 – by former journalists Brian Cathcart and Paddy French184 and by BBC journalists in Radio 4’s 11 
October episode of The Corrections.185
Both analyses allege serious shortcomings in newsgathering procedures and reporting by The Times over a 
series of stories about the placing of a child in foster care by Tower Hamlets Borough Council. The story 
gained nationwide prominence and was repeated in the coverage of multiple IPSO members, including 
the Daily Mail. The prominence of the story, the subject matter, and the allegations of systemic flaws in 
the procedures by which the story came to be published in its final form – as well as the award-winning 
reputation of the journalist who broke the story, Andrew Norfolk – all suggest that it would be a legitimate 
and appropriate focus for investigation by a regulatory body tasked with policing standards. 
The salient features of the story as presented in the original article published on 28 August 2017 on the 
front page of The Times are set out in the headline and the first two paragraphs of the story:
CHRISTIAN CHILD FORCED INTO MUSLIM FOSTER CARE
Concern for girl who ‘had cross removed and was encouraged to learn Arabic’
 A white Christian child was taken from her family and forced to live with a niqab-wearing foster 
carer in a home where she was allegedly encouraged to learn Arabic.
 The five-year-old girl, a native English speaker, has spent the past six months in the care of two 
Muslim households in London. The foster placements were made, against the wishes of the girl’s 
family, by the scandal-ridden borough of Tower Hamlets.186
The BBC investigation into the story as part of the series The Corrections includes the following assertions 
from a former journalist and a representative of a fostering charity about that passage:
¡ The headline is inaccurate;
¡ The description of the child as ‘white Christian’ is wrong;
¡ The verb ‘forced’ is used, when ‘placed’ would more accurately describe the process;
¡ The child was not encouraged to learn Arabic;
¡ Important information about the child’s linguistic background was omitted.
Both the investigation by Cathcart and French187 and the BBC investigation found that a series of 
omissions in the story produced a misleading picture of events. For example, on the day the article was 
published by The Times the case was still actively being considered by the courts. In response to ongoing 
184. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting – A 
Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_Unmasked.pdf
185. BBC Radio 4 (2019) The Corrections – The Carbonara Case, 11 October 2019: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
m000950v
186. Norfolk, Andrew (2017) ‘Christian child forced into Muslim foster care,’ thetimes.co.uk, 28 August 2017: https://www.
thetimes.co.uk/article/christian-child-forced-into-muslim-foster-care-by-tower-hamlets-council-3gcp6l8cs
187. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting 
– A Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_
Unmasked.pdf (p. 16)
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speculation, the judge made additional information available to prevent harm to the child.188 This 
significant and clarifying information was not included in The Times story, including the following details:
¡ The original foster placement had been made as an emergency measure, because the child was 
considered to be in immediate danger when taken into care by the police;
¡ The child’s mother had alcohol and substance abuse issues;
¡ The child’s guardian, appointed by the court, had reported that the child was ‘well cared for’;
¡ To the satisfaction of all parties, the girl was to go and live with her maternal grandmother, who is Muslim.
The omitted information undermined the central points of the story. While both investigations raise 
other concerns about the newsgathering process of both the journalist and The Times, Cathcart and 
French outline how the availability of this information to the journalist raise deeper concerns about the 
journalistic procedures leading to publication:
In our view all of this information was accessible to Norfolk and a responsible journalist would have 
made it his or her business to have found it out before publication. To have included these facts in 
his article, with due prominence, would without doubt have altered his readers’ understanding of the 
case. The black-and-white picture would have appeared, far less dramatically, in shades of grey. But 
the matter of omission is not simple, because to have disclosed this information at this stage would 
in some cases have been a breach of the court’s legal confidentiality requirements. In other words, 
Norfolk was not free to paint the picture in all its shades. This did not, however, justify publishing the 
article as it appeared, indeed in our view a fair-minded journalist seeking to present readers with an 
accurate account of the case would have recoiled from publishing so unbalanced an account.
As shown in Appendix 3 below, IPSO handled one complaint from Tower Hamlets Borough Council about 
a follow-on story published by The Times on 30 August 2017, but did not handle any of the more than 250 
complaints about inaccuracies in the 28 August story considered here. An approach from Cathcart and French 
to IPSO received the reply that ‘Without the involvement of an individual in the position to know the facts of 
this case, we considered that it would be difficult to effectively investigate the alleged inaccuracies.’189
When a regulator is prevented from using its complaint-handling function in such a high-profile and 
emotive case in which potential serious inaccuracies have been identified in two detailed and independent 
investigations, a Standards Investigation would seem to be the natural course of action. IPSO has to date 
not engaged in such an investigation.
Regulation 53, on the triggers available for IPSO to launch a Standards Investigation make the likelihood 
of an investigation in a case like this extremely small. The ‘serious and systemic’ hurdle again blocks any 
potential investigation, while none of the other triggers apply. The end result is that a high-profile and 
emotive story that led to several front-page articles but which collapsed under external scrutiny could not 
be investigated by the regulator.
188. Judiciary.uk (2014) Case Management Order – No. 7 : https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/case-
management-order-lbtw-cd-and-ors-20170830.pdf 
189. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting 
– A Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_
Unmasked.pdf (p. 53)
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Case Study 3: Sunday Mirror Brooks Newmark story – IPSO’s quasi-investigation
In the weeks after beginning operation in September 2014, IPSO was presented with a story published 
by one of its members in which there appeared to be prima facie evidence of questionable newsgathering 
techniques potentially in breach of Clause 10 of the Editors’ Code on Clandestine Devices and 
Subterfuge. IPSO chose to conduct a semi-official inquiry (something that was not provided for in 
the IPSO Regulations at that time, but included in subsequent versions) in which the result, while 
contestable, was arrived at transparently but the processes by which the inquiry was conducted contained 
significant flaws that exposed the regulator’s lack of power. The unofficial inquiry also deflected attention 
from the inherent difficulty of launching a proper Standards Investigation, which would likely not have 
been possible under the circumstances.
On 27 September 2014 a Conservative government minister, Brooks Newmark, pre-emptively resigned 
before the publication the following day of a story outlining inappropriate behaviour towards a supposed 
young Conservative activist via private messages on social media.190 It quickly transpired that the story, 
conducted by a journalist in a freelance capacity and published by the Sunday Mirror, was the result of a 
months-long investigation in which multiple Conservative or former Conservative MPs had been targeted 
by the (male) journalist using a fake social media account to pose as a young female Conservative activist, 
created using images of real women without their permission.191 
The journalist engaged in text conversations with Newmark over an extended period, culminating in 
an exchange of sexually explicit images. This exchange formed the basis of the story, and prompted the 
ministerial resignation. Another MP also targeted as part of the investigation, Mark Pritchard, made 
complaints to the police and to IPSO alleging a breach of Clause 10 of the Editors’ Code.192 
The relevant part ii) of Clause 10 states that ‘Engaging in misrepresentation or subterfuge, including 
by agents or intermediaries, can generally be justified only in the public interest and then only when 
the material cannot be obtained by other means.’193 Allegations that the investigation was a ‘fishing 
expedition,’ as alleged in Pritchard’s complaint due to the fact that multiple MPs were targeted in the 
investigation, would have constituted a breach of the code (following the precedent of a 2010 ruling by 
the Press Complaints Commission) due to the lack of a public interest justification in an investigation 
‘designed solely to entrap members of parliament.’194 
Beyond the potential deployment of a fishing expedition to entrap MPs, several additional concerns were 
raised about the nature of the story, including:
190. Moss, Vincent and Matthew Drake (2014) ‘Tory minister Brooks Newmark quits over sex scandal,’ mirror.co.uk, 27 
September 2014: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/tory-minister-brooks-newmark-quits-4335398
191. Waterson, Jim and Alan White (2014) ‘Swedish model upset after her Instagram selfie was used by Sunday Mirror to bring 
down Brooks Newmark,’ buzzfeed.com, 27 September 2014: https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/brooks-newmark-
resignation#36cp4wh)
192. Wintour, Patrick, Alexandra Topping and Josh Halliday (2014) ‘MP refers Sunday Mirror to police and press regulator over 
sex sting,’ theguardian.co.uk, 29 September 2014 : https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/29/sunday-mirror-
complaint-ipso-press-regulator-sex-sting
193. Editors’ Code of Practice Committee (n.d.) ‘The Code,’ editorscode.org.uk, https://www.editorscode.org.uk/the_code.php
194. Martinson, Jane (2014) ‘Brooks Newmark sex sting : Ipso to investigate Sunday Mirror,’ theguardian.com, 29 September 
2014 : https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/29/sunday-mirror-complaint-ipso-press-regulator-sex-sting
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¡ That the story had previously been offered to other newspapers who had rejected it;195
¡ That the use of subterfuge involved sending sexually explicit pictures to the MP to elicit a response in kind;196
¡ That the journalist conducting the investigation created the fake social media account using an image 
pulled from the Instagram profile of a Swedish woman without her permission;197
¡ That the Sunday Mirror quickly reached a confidential settlement with Pritchard, which involved a 
donation to a charity of his choice and the closure of his complaint to IPSO.198 As a result, IPSO has 
no record of the nature of the (withdrawn) complaint.
Despite the withdrawal of the complaint, IPSO decided to proceed with an inquiry even though its 
Regulations at the time only allowed IPSO to consider complaints about alleged code breaches and launch 
Standards Investigations on the basis of the triggers outlined above.
To recap, Regulation 53199 contains two potential triggers relevant in this case: a ‘Systemic Failure’ due to 
‘serious and systemic breaches’ (Regulation 53.1), and ‘in exceptional circumstances’ where legal issues or 
Editors’ Code compliance issues ‘are raised about the practices of a Regulated Entity or Regulated Entities’ 
(Regulation 53.3). It is unlikely that either of these could have been invoked as a justification for a Standards 
Investigation by IPSO: in the former case because the potential breach could not be ruled as such in the absence 
of a complaint (and it could not be described as serious and systemic); in the latter because no legal issues 
were to be flagged, and code compliance issues could not be confirmed without prior evidence of breaches.
Therefore, with neither prerequisite for further action met, the regulator chose instead to conduct an ad 
hoc inquiry that was retroactively legitimised by a revision to IPSO’s regulations two years later. In the 
event of IPSO finding the Sunday Mirror guilty of a code breach the regulator would have had no powers 
to sanction the publication.
Ultimately, this did not represent a significant problem because IPSO found the Sunday Mirror to have 
been justified in using subterfuge at each stage of the investigation, and found that publication was in the 
public interest.200 IPSO’s ruling is detailed and open to public scrutiny. There are, however, certain aspects 
of the ruling that show the weakness of the regulator relative to its members or which cast doubt on the 
processes by which the investigation was conducted and its conclusions were reached.
Paragraph 6 of the ruling, for example, consists of the following:
The Sunday Mirror maintains that IPSO does not have the power to make formal inquiries, leading 
to an adjudication, about this matter, in the absence of a complaint from a directly involved party. It 
195. Moss, Vincent and Matthew Drake (2014) ‘Tory minister Brooks Newmark quits over sex scandal,’ mirror.co.uk, 27 
September 2014: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/tory-minister-brooks-newmark-quits-4335398
196. https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/tory-minister-brooks-newmark-quits-4335398
197. Waterson, Jim and Alan White (2014) ‘Swedish model upset after her Instagram selfie was used by Sunday Mirror to bring 
down Brooks Newmark,’ buzzfeed.com, 27 September 2014: https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/brooks-newmark-
resignation#36cp4wh)
198. Greenslade, Roy (2014) ‘Why did the Sunday Mirror settle with Tory MP who complained to Ipso ?’ theguardian.com, 22 
October 2014 : https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/22/sundaymirror-ipso
199. Regulation 40 in the version of the IPSO Regulations in use at the time of the Brooks Newmark story
200. Julian, Vikki (2015) ‘Brooks Newmark Sunday Mirror case: IPSO decision,’ ipso.co.uk, 26 March 2015: https://www.ipso.
co.uk/news-press-releases/news/brooks-newmark-sunday-mirror-case-ipso-decision/
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emphasised, however, that it did not seek to avoid addressing IPSO’s concerns. The newspaper cooperated 
with the investigation, making full submissions. IPSO does not accept the newspaper’s contention, 
but does acknowledge that this power needs to be more explicitly stated in its regulations. Accordingly, 
this is the determination of the Committee and is not an adjudication under the existing rules.
The Sunday Mirror was, under the circumstances, correct to assert that IPSO had no power to produce an 
adjudication in this case. IPSO contests this opinion without evidence and acknowledges that the ruling does 
not constitute an adjudication, and therefore would have held no power if the regulator’s decision had gone 
against, rather than for, the publication. The publisher therefore had the power to withdraw from the inquiry 
at any stage. Under IPSO’s post-2016 Regulations, the inquiry could have resulted in an adjudication but not 
the additional sanctions available to the regulator on completion of a Standards Investigation.
As well as having the power to withdraw from the inquiry, the Sunday Mirror was also under no obligation 
to provide access to the journalist or to documentation. As media commentator and former editor of the 
Daily Mirror Roy Greenslade noted, IPSO ‘did not interview or communicate in any way with Wickham’ 
during the inquiry.201 This has implications for one of the main pieces of evidence cited by IPSO in 
reaching its conclusion clearing the Sunday Mirror. As noted in Paragraph 10 of IPSO’s ruling, while 
the journalist ‘had received information about several individuals, the focus of the investigation, from 
the start, according to the Sunday Mirror, was Mr Newmark.’ It is not at all clear how IPSO confirmed 
or corroborated this claim without contact with the journalist. No evidence is supplied or referred to in 
support of the claim.
IPSO also concedes that the Sunday Mirror only supplied a redacted version of the correspondence between 
the journalist and Newmark leading to the exchange of explicit images. As Paragraph 20 of the ruling states:
During IPSO’s inquiries, the Sunday Mirror declined to provide full details of the messages 
exchanged between the reporter and Mr Newmark, without Mr Newmark’s consent. It did provide 
a redacted version of the exchange which quoted the chronology of the messages published in the 
article, including those quoted above. Given its own duty of confidentiality, IPSO questions the 
need for the full exchange to have been withheld or redacted, but appreciates the need to take into 
account Mr Newmark’s privacy. Nonetheless, IPSO had sufficient information about the exchange 
of direct messages to reach the above conclusion.
The final assertion here, that IPSO had sufficient evidence despite questioning the need for redaction, is 
not clarified in further detail. The ‘above conclusion’ is that the journalist was justified in ‘accelerating the 
subterfuge’ to the point at which the target of the investigation reciprocated in sharing a sexually explicit 
image. It is central to the final ruling by IPSO – that subterfuge was justified at each stage, and that the 
public interest test of ‘exposing serious impropriety by an MP’ was met – and yet the conclusion was 
reached on the basis of unnecessarily redacted material.
There are three further issues with IPSO’s justification for its conclusions on the basis of the evidence 
apparently supplied by the Sunday Mirror. The first is the question of whether the publisher supplied 
any further information to the regulator than simply the contents of its original story published on 28 
201. Greenslade, Roy (2015) ‘Ipso’s ruling on the Sunday Mirror over Brooks Newmark sting is flawed,’ theguardian.com, 26 
March 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/mar/26/ipsos-ruling-on-the-sunday-mirror-over-
brooks-newmark-sting-is-flawed
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September 2014. The above quote from paragraph 20 of IPSO’s response appears to assert that IPSO 
received no further information about the exchange of information between the journalist and the MP 
than that laid out in the original story as published.
The section of the IPSO ruling headed ‘Misrepresentation and subterfuge after Brooks Newmark initiated 
private communication’ consists of only two paragraphs, of which only the second (Paragraph 17) deals 
with the private exchanges between Newmark and the journalist after the first direct message. It reads:
After a number of messages had been exchanged, including a suggestion by Mr Newmark that 
they meet, he had asked ‘Sophie’ to send a photograph of herself. Following an exchange of several 
pictures, ‘Sophie’ suggested that they ‘take it to the next level’. Mr Newmark agreed and, having 
received an explicit image, requested a further image in a different pose in exchange for ‘something 
in return.’ The newspaper says that he later sent an explicit image of himself.
This exchange recounts exactly the version of events in the Sunday Mirror’s original story with no additional 
information.202 While IPSO does not explain what evidence it did receive, the similarities between the original 
article and IPSO’s description suggests that the regulator’s decision was made with no more information 
about the exchange than was made available to the public six months before the ruling was published.
The second issue is the fact that IPSO accepted the Sunday Mirror’s assertions that the withholding 
and redacting of evidence about the above exchanges were necessary to protect Mr Newmark’s privacy 
(Paragraph 20, above), and that evidence to substantiate the claims that there was a public interest 
justification in pursuing the investigation by means of subterfuge in the public interest should also be 
withheld from IPSO (Paragraph 27). IPSO has a duty to confidentiality, as the ruling notes in Paragraph 
20, and so these assertions are both false and demonstrative of the lack of power of the regulator not only 
in accepting the lack of evidence, but in deciding that it was not necessary to reach its conclusion.
Finally, the ruling – in accepting this – also fails to acknowledge or to inquire about the fact that at least 
two newspapers (the Sun and the Mail on Sunday) rejected the story before it was picked up by the Sunday 
Mirror. As Roy Greenslade noted at the time, ‘I am aware of the reasons that [the journalist] was turned 
away by the Sun and I believe IPSO should have made an effort to discover them.’203 The regulator, 
however, did not do so.
Overall, the informal IPSO inquiry into the Sunday Mirror story highlighted the regulator’s lack of 
powers while masking its inability to launch a Standards Investigation or to record a code breach where 
the affected individual did not complain. The inquiry allowed the publisher to refuse to provide full 
information on the newsgathering conducted for the story, and then exonerated the publisher on the basis 
of the incomplete information that it did choose to provide, much of which appears to have been in the 
public domain. Perhaps more significant than the regulator’s choice to initiate such an inquiry without 
any powers at the time to do so is the fact that – in the five years since – there has been no Standards 
Investigation and no further inquiries.
202. Moss, Vincent and Matthew Drake (2014) ‘Tory minister Brooks Newmark quits over sex scandal,’ mirror.co.uk, 27 
September 2014: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/tory-minister-brooks-newmark-quits-4335398
203. Greenslade, Roy (2015) ‘Ipso’s ruling on the Sunday Mirror over Brooks Newmark sting is flawed,’ theguardian.com, 26 
March 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/mar/26/ipsos-ruling-on-the-sunday-mirror-over-
brooks-newmark-sting-is-flawed
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APPENDIX 3 – IPSO COMPLAINT-HANDLING 
CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1: Belcher v The Times (April 2019)204
In this case, where a complaint was brought against The Times alleging breaches of the Editors’ Code 
clauses on accuracy and discrimination, IPSO decided that no breach had taken place.
The article complained about was an opinion piece in which the columnist discussed comments made by 
the complainant regarding media coverage of transgender issues, as well as the opinions of the columnist 
about how activists referred to the suicide rate of transgender people. A key part of the complaint was 
the attribution in the article of the quote ‘Better a living daughter than a dead son’ to activists advising 
parents of trans teenagers considering medical intervention. The complainant claimed that this quote had 
been invented. The newspaper submitted no evidence that the quote was real, instead claiming that it 
‘summarised’ sentiments advanced by activists. 
IPSO accepted the newspaper’s explanation, reaching the following conclusion:
The article’s claim that some trans activists tell parents, ‘Better a living daughter than a dead son’, was 
a summation of advice parents of transgender children had claimed to have received. The newspaper 
had provided accounts of activists warning parents of the potential suicide risk if they did not listen 
to or act on their child’s comments on gender identity. Summarising the advice of activists in this way 
was not misleading, as the sentiment behind the remarks – i.e. that a child may take their own life if 
parents do not act on their child’s remarks – was accurately conveyed. The newspaper had taken care 
over the accuracy of this statement. There was no breach of Clause 1 [Accuracy] on this point.
IPSO’s finding – that an invented quote can fail to represent an inaccuracy – suggests substantial leniency 
over what could be considered an inaccurate statement in a newspaper article. 
Case Study 2: Tower Hamlets Borough Council v The Times (April 2018)205
This complaint referred to a high-profile case in which The Times reported on the placing of a child in 
foster care by Tower Hamlets Borough Council. The story was widely reported following the initial Times 
articles, given the story’s central allegation that a Christian child had been ‘forced into Muslim foster care.’ 
Subsequent investigations into the story by Brian Cathcart and Paddy French,206 and by the BBC207 found 
several aspects of the story to have been misleading (see Appendix 2 above).
The complaint by Tower Hamlets Borough Council took several parts. The first, on the claim by The Times 
in one of the articles that the Council was guilty of a ‘failure’ in its placement of a child with a foster carer, 
was upheld by IPSO as inaccurate. A second part of the complaint concerned the failure of The Times 
204. IPSO (2019) ‘07454–18 Belcher v The Times,’ 15 March 2019: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/
ruling/?id=07454–18
205. IPSO’s handling of this story in relation to the regulator’s capacity to launch standards investigations is examined in Part 1 
of this report.
206. Cathcart, Brian and Paddy French (2019) Unmasked: Andrew Norfolk, The Times Newspaper and Anti-Muslim Reporting – A 
Case to Answer, London: Hacked Off: https://hackinginquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Norfolk_Report_Unmasked.pdf
207. BBC Radio 4 (2019) The Corrections – The Carbonara Case, 11 October 2019: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000950v
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to make clear that the child’s grandmother was a Muslim – a key detail given the focus of the story on 
the religious differences between the child and the foster parents, and one which considerably alters the 
significance of the main claims of the articles. IPSO’s response to that aspect of the complaint reads:
The concern raised in the previous two days’ coverage was that foster placements organised by the 
complainant were not culturally matched with the child, due to the religious practices of the foster 
parents. It appeared to be accepted by all parties however that the grandmother was not a religiously 
observant Muslim, and that she was a culturally appropriate placement. For these reasons, the 
Committee did not find that the omission of information about the grandmother’s background in 
the article constituted a failure to take care over the accuracy of the article.
The regulator also accepted the newspaper’s explanation that a desire to avoid the possible identification 
of the child drove the omission of relevant information. The investigation by Brian Cathcart and Paddy 
French suggests that by failing to identify the religious background of the grandmother (and by extension 
the religious heritage of the child) The Times was able to sustain the allegation that the foster placing was 
inappropriate: ‘The implication of IPSO’s ruling, therefore, was that it was legitimate for The Times to 
present an inaccurate picture of the case because some of the information might have been confidential.’
The subsequent BBC investigation of the case, broadcast on the Radio 4 programme The Corrections on 11 
October 2019, also set out the extent to which information omitted by The Times in the original reporting 
of the case rendered many aspects of the high-profile story potentially misleading. 
Case Study 3: Prevent Watch v Sunday Telegraph208
This complaint concerned an objection by a group identified by the Sunday Telegraph as ‘Muslim 
extremists’ and ‘Islamic activists’ and accused of ‘using coordinated links to mainstream news 
organisations, including the BBC, to spread fear and confusion in Muslim communities about the 
Government’s anti-terror policy, Prevent.’ The article named two individuals linked to Prevent Watch. The 
complaint had several parts, but IPSO summarised the central component as follows:
The complainant said that it was inaccurate for the article to describe Prevent Watch as ‘Islamist 
activists’, and to say that it was ‘linked’ to the organisations Cage and Mend, which the newspaper 
had described as ‘a group known to sympathise with terrorists’ and ‘an extremist front group’ 
respectively. It said that it was also inaccurate to state that the mother named in the article was a 
Prevent Watch ‘activist’; the complainant said that she was in fact a client, and that there was no 
‘activist’ position in Prevent Watch. The complainant was also concerned that it was inaccurate to 
suggest that the father was acting in bad faith as an ‘activist’ when he had criticised the local council; 
he was entitled to express his views about Prevent regardless of his association with Prevent Watch.
IPSO found in favour of the newspaper in all aspects of the complaint, including on the status of the 
named individuals.
Subsequently, the ‘father’ named in the case received financial damages and an apology from the Telegraph 
after suing the newspaper for the same story that IPSO had found to be in no way misleading.209 The 
Telegraph’s apology as a result of the legal case accepted that the story had been misleading in accusing the 
individual of supporting Islamic extremists.
208. IPSO (2016) ‘00615–16 Prevent Watch v The Sunday Telegraph,’ 15 July 2016: https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-
resolution-statements/ruling/?id=00615–16
209. Ponsford, Dominic (2017) ‘Sunday Telegraph pays £20,000 in libel damages to man wrongly described as “Islamic 
activist”,’ pressgazette.co.uk, 8 August 2017: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/sunday-telegraph-pays-20000-in-libel-
damages-to-man-wrongly-described-as-islamist-activist/
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APPENDIX 4 – IPSO ANNUAL REPORT 
COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATION 52
List of components in Regulation 52:210
1. Identity of Regulated Entities
2. Significant change in the number of Regulated Entities
3. Number of articles in relation to which the Regulator has handled substantive complaints
4. The outcomes reached in aggregate for all the Regulated Entities
5. The outcomes in relation to each Regulated Entity
6. Summary of any Standards Investigations carried out
7. The outcomes of such investigations
8. Report on the adequacy and effectiveness of Regulated Entities’ compliance processes
9. Information about the Arbitration Service, including the extent to which it has been used
Excluding 6 and 7 which do not apply due to the lack of any Standards Investigations having been carried 
out at the time of writing, this leaves seven components.
EVIDENCE FOR CONCLUSIONS
2015 Annual Report
Regulation 52 Component Reason for decision
Identity of Regulated Entities 
(REs)
Yes – list of publishers on pages 23 and 24
Significant change in the 
number of REs N/A – First Annual Report
No. of articles where IPSO has 
handled complaints
Yes – page 22
The outcomes reached in 
aggregate for all REs
Yes – page 22
The outcomes in relation to  
each RE
Yes – pages 23 and 24, although not detailed information: only 
includes Upheld/Resolved/Not Upheld
Report on REs’ compliance 
processes and procedures
No
Information about the 
Arbitration Service and its use
Yes, though only on consultation as the Arbitration Service had not 
yet been set up
210. IPSO (2019) Regulations, London: Independent Press Standards Organisation: https://www.ipso.co.uk/media/1815/ipso-
regulations-2019-v-sep19.pdf
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2016 Annual Report
Regulation 52 Component Reason for decision
Identity of Regulated Entities 
(REs)
Yes – pages 16–17 and 30–31. Discrepancies exist between IPSO list 
of publishers and annual statements by regulated entities, however
Significant change in the 
number of REs
N/A – net change of one regulated publisher from previous year
No. of articles where IPSO has 
handled complaints
Yes – page 10
The outcomes reached in 
aggregate for all REs
Yes – page 10
The outcomes in relation to 
each RE
Yes – pages 16–17
Report on REs’ compliance 
processes and procedures
No
Information about the 
Arbitration Service and its use
Yes – pages 22–23
2017 Annual Report
Regulation 52 Component Reason for decision
Identity of Regulated Entities 
(REs)
Yes – pages 22–23 and 34–40
Significant change in the 
number of REs
N/A – though significant discrepancies between annual statements 
and list of publishers
No. of articles where IPSO has 
handled complaints
Yes – page 21
The outcomes reached in 
aggregate for all REs
Yes – page 21
The outcomes in relation to 
each RE
Yes – pages 22–23
Report on REs’ compliance 
processes and procedures
No
Information about the 
Arbitration Service and its use
Yes – page 17
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2018 Annual Report
Regulation 52 Component Reason for decision
Identity of Regulated Entities 
(REs)
Yes – pages 30–37
Significant change in the 
number of REs
N/A
No. of articles where IPSO has 
handled complaints
Yes – pages 16–17
The outcomes reached in 
aggregate for all REs
Yes – pages 22–23
The outcomes in relation to 
each RE
Yes – pages 22–23
Report on REs’ compliance 
processes and procedures
No
Information about the 
Arbitration Service and its use
Yes – page 15
2019 Annual Report
Regulation 52 Component Reason for decision
Identity of Regulated Entities 
(REs)
Yes – pages 13–14
Significant change in the 
number of REs
Yes – page 5
No. of articles where IPSO has 
handled complaints
Yes – page 10
The outcomes reached in 
aggregate for all REs
Yes – pages 13–14
The outcomes in relation to 
each RE
Yes – pages 13–14
Report on REs’ compliance 
processes and procedures
No
Information about the 
Arbitration Service and its use
Yes – page 9
74  IPSO:  REGULATOR OR COMPLAINTS HANDLER?
APPENDIX 5 – SELECTED COMPLAINTS 
POLICY INFORMATION
Complaints Policy Page, i Newspaper211
JPI Media/National World – Yorkshire Post212
211. iNews (n.d.) ‘Contact Us,’ inews.co.uk: https://inews.co.uk/contact-us (accessed 2 February 2021)
212. Yorkshire Post (n.d.) ‘Find Us,’ yorkshirepost.co.uk: https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/contact-us
IPSO: REGULATOR OR COMPLAINTS HANDLER?  75
Newsquest Homepage Footer (taken from Glasgow Times)213
Newsquest – Glasgow Times 
(Contacts Page, following ‘contact the editor here’ link)214
213. Glasgow Times (n.d.) ‘Homepage,’ glasgowtimes.co.uk: https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/ (the Evening Times rebranded 
as the Glasgow Times in December 2019)
214. Glasgow Times (n.d.) ‘Contact Us,’ glasgowtimes.co.uk: https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/contact-us/
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Newsquest – Penarth Times (Contacts Page)215
215. Penarth Times (n.d.) ‘Contact Us,’ penarthtimes.co.uk: https://www.penarthtimes.co.uk/contact/ 
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APPENDIX 6 – PUBLISHER ANNUAL 
STATEMENT COMPLIANCE WITH ANNEX A
National News Publishers’ Fulfilment of Annex A Requirements (2019)
Annex A Requirement Publisher Fulfilment
Clause 2: Copies of any internal 
manuals, codes or guidance 
used by journalists
Associated Newspapers
Yes – included in Appendices 5 & 6 
(pp. 26–30)
News UK & Ireland No – not included
Reach Plc No – not included
Telegraph Media Group Yes – included in pp. 9–12
Clause 3.1: Compliance with 
the Editors’ Code
Associated Newspapers
Partially included – internal complaints 
statistics included (pp. 9–11), but no 
recording of code breaches (p. 9)
News UK & Ireland
No – no internal complaints statistics 
included, or details on code breaches at 
level of internal compliance processes
Reach Plc
Partially included – complaints statistics 
included on p. 12, but no recorded code 
breaches
Telegraph Media Group
No – compliance mentioned on p. 6, but 
no evidence or statistics of numbers of 
complaints or of numbers of breaches
Clause 3.2: Any adverse 
findings of the regulator and 
steps taken to address such 
findings
Associated Newspapers
Yes – adverse findings listed on p. 7, with 
steps taken outlined on p. 8
News UK & Ireland
Partially included – URLs only of IPSO 
cases listed on pp. 10–11. Limited 
information on steps taken in response
Reach Plc Yes – included on pp. 13–20
Telegraph Media Group
Yes – list of adverse findings and 
responses on pp. 7–8
Clause 3.3: Training of staff
Associated Newspapers Yes – included on p6
News UK & Ireland Yes – included on pp. 12–13
Reach Plc Yes – included on pp. 11–12
Telegraph Media Group Yes – included on p. 6
Clause 4: Details of the steps 
taken by the Regulated Entity 
in response to any adverse 
Adjudications by the Regulator 
during the previous year
Associated Newspapers
No – no references to steps taken in 
response to performance in previous 
year
News UK & Ireland No – no evidence included
Reach Plc No – no evidence included
Telegraph Media Group No – no evidence included
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